

An Economic Study of Recent Washington Child Support Orders

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Analysis of Child Support Orders

Summary of Findings

- **Median net monthly income of noncustodial fathers is \$1757.**
Significant variation exists between the non-IVD and the IV-D cases, with a difference of over \$1400 of net income a month. The Administrative IVD cases display the lowest median income at \$1389 while the Direct Pay non-IVD shows the highest at \$2846 per month.
- **The median value of the order amount is \$327 for all noncustodial fathers.**
This amount represents the total amount the noncustodial father is ordered to pay in child support for all the children associated with this child support order; that is, it is not the median amount per child. Additionally, this value includes any deviations – upward or downward - from the presumptive amounts established by the Schedule.

Given the differences in income across categories, order amounts vary significantly among them. Administrative IVD fathers are ordered to pay \$287 while Direct Pay non-IVD fathers are ordered to pay \$549.

- **For all noncustodial fathers, the order amount represents 19.0 percent of their monthly income. While some variation exists among the four strata, it is fairly small.**

The Administrative IVD cases are ordered to pay the highest percentage at 19.6 percent, while Court IVD orders are the smallest at 18.4 percent.

- **The data indicate that deviations are common: 29.0 percent of the orders differ from the presumptive amounts.** The vast majority of these (85.1%) are downward deviations with a median decrease of \$113 from the presumptive amount.

Substantial variation in deviation rates exists among the four strata: the most striking is seen among the Administrative IV-D cases. Only 14.0 percent of these entail a deviation. This differs markedly from the other categories, even within the other IV-D category, where 30.3 percent have a deviation in their order. Among the Direct Pay and Payment Service non-IVD cases, 42.5 percent and 38.0 percent deviated, respectively. The significant variation in deviation rates suggests that different award-establishment processes are occurring for the Administrative IV-D cases than the other strata.

- **Noncustodial mothers' income is only 60.3 percent (\$1060) of noncustodial fathers' income.**
- **For noncustodial mothers, the order amount represents 15.2 percent of their monthly income (compared to 19 percent for noncustodial fathers).**
- **Noncustodial mothers are not more likely to have a deviation; however, deviations represent a 54.3 percent reduction in their order (compared to fathers' deviations at a 32.2 percent reduction in their orders.)**

While no one reason predominated for noncustodial fathers, this is not the case for noncustodial mothers: almost half of the deviations (45.3 percent) arise from a singular cause: their incomes are below the poverty level (the AFDC Needs Standard).

- **The vast majority of orders (92.0 percent) involve one or two children.**
The number of children in the non-IVD cases is slightly greater at an average of 1.59 children, compared to the IV-D cases with an average of 1.34 children.
- **For one child, noncustodial fathers are ordered to pay \$285, which represents 17.8 percent of net income. For two children, the amount rises to \$531 or 25.0 percent of income.**

These findings are consistent with the Schedule, which takes into account the fact that additional children entail additional costs, while at the same time recognizing that two children are not twice as costly as one.

The data show that both the likelihood of a deviation and the amount of the deviation increases with the number of children in the order.

- **The most common order type in the database overall is a child support order prompted by a divorce, accounting for 27.8 percent of all orders.**
Most of these (88.7 percent) are in non-IVD categories.
- **The second most common order type is “Administrative Notice Default,” representing 21.4 percent of all orders in the database.**
These account for 63.1 percent of the Administrative IV-D caseload.
- **The four categories differ significantly in the types of orders they establish.**
Divorces account for 77.8 percent of the Direct Pay caseload and 62.7 percent of the PSO category, but less than 10 percent of IVD cases. Paternity orders are established almost entirely within the IV-D category, with just over 15 percent handled within the non-IVD strata.
- **Orders in the Urban West are somewhat higher in terms of their proportion of income (19.7 percent) compared to the orders in the East at 18.1 percent.**
- **Income imputation for the purpose of establishing child support orders is common: 37.8 percent of the orders for noncustodial fathers are based on imputed income values.**
The proportion of income ordered is very similar: 18.4 percent for imputed income orders compared to 19.3 percent for those derived from actual income.

Among the four strata, median imputed income ranges between 75 and 80 percent of median actual income.

- **Deviations are more likely among imputed income orders than actual orders in every category but PSO.**
- **Income imputation is as likely among noncustodial mothers as fathers: 38.4 percent.**

Median imputed income ranges from 56 percent of actual income in the Direct Pay category to 92 percent in the Administrative category, a much larger spread than observed for noncustodial fathers.

- **The latter part of the report examines the following outliers:**

- 1. Orders in excess of 45 percent of net income**

Such orders are rare, comprising only 1.4 percent of noncustodial fathers and even fewer mothers. They have lower median income than other orders and much higher upward deviation amounts.

- 2. Orders with income greater than \$5000**

Slightly less than 14 percent of the orders have combined incomes over \$5000, most of these involve noncustodial fathers. While most of these orders comply with the Schedule's instructions, between 23 percent and 29 percent do not.

Similarly, for the 5.3 percent of orders with income in excess \$7000, most adhere to the Schedule's instructions. However, between 16 percent and 19 percent (depending on the number of children) are not ordered to pay the expected minimum amount.

- 3. Orders with income below \$600**

For these 171 orders (4.1 percent of all orders), the median order amount is \$25 for one child and \$50 for two children. No child support is ordered for 20 percent of the noncustodial fathers in these cases and 38 percent of the noncustodial mothers.

- 4. Orders with an order amount of zero**

There are 153 orders (4.7 percent) where the noncustodial father is ordered to pay nothing. Compared to those with nonzero order amounts, these are associated with lower median incomes and lower deviation rates. They are more likely to be an Administrative order and equally likely to be based on imputed income. The findings for noncustodial mothers with order of zero are similar.

- 5. Orders based on Zero Income**

There are 114 orders (3.5 percent) where the noncustodial father has zero income. While the median transfer amount for these fathers is \$25, 24 percent are ordered to pay nothing. These orders are much less likely to involve a deviation and more likely to be Court IVD orders. The most common order type for these cases is "Judgement/Paternity" and they are much less likely to rely on imputed income. Noncustodial mothers with zero income are more likely to be "Administrative Notice Default" and found in the Administrative IVD category. Like noncustodial fathers, they are much less likely to involve a deviation or to be based on imputed income.

Introduction

This report provides an analysis of the findings from the database compiled for the purposes of investigating the outcomes that flow from the point of order origin. The purpose is to further the goals of the Strategic Plan of the Office of Child Support Enforcement of increasing collection of child support.¹ The objective of the study is to understand the processes and components of how child support orders are established.

Tables I-A and II-A provide a general overview of some of the key variables in the analysis, for those orders where the noncustodial parent is the father.² Tables I-B and II-B provide the same data for noncustodial mothers. Because one of the primary interests in our analysis is to compare the outcomes associated with non-IVD cases to those of Washington’s Division of Child Support IVD cases, the variables³ in these tables are categorized by four strata:

- “Direct Pay,” (Dirpay) where one party pays child support to the other directly;
- “Payment Service Only” (PSO), where payment is made through the registry;
- “Court Ordered (CourtIVD);
- “Administrative” (AdminIVD).

The first two - “Direct Pay” and “Payment Service Only” - represent non-IVD cases, while the latter two - “Court Ordered” and “Administrative” - are IVD orders.

The variables presented in these first two tables are: net monthly income (*net*), actual order amount (*trxpymnt*), order amount as a percent of income (*pctinc*), whether the order deviated from the presumptive amount in the Schedule (*whdev*), the amount of the deviation if it increased the order (*updev*) and the amount of the deviation if it decreased the order (*downdev*).

What is the monthly income of noncustodial fathers? How much are they ordered to pay in child support and what percent of their incomes does the child support order require?

The bottom row, first column of Table I-A indicates that the median net monthly income of noncustodial fathers is \$1757.⁴ Significant variation exists between the non-IVD and the IV-D

¹ The time frame for sampling was from October 1, 2000, through February 28, 2001.

² The father is the noncustodial parent in 81.7 percent of the orders. More specifically, 81.7 percent of those with nonmissing values. (Only 4.2 percent of the cases had a missing value for noncustodial parent.) Throughout the discussion in this report, percentages will be reported “of those with nonmissing values.”

³ A note on variables in the following discussion and tables: For the readers’ understanding, variables will be referred to by their full name to provide as complete an explanation of their meaning as possible. Immediately following their introduction, the variables will also be given – in parentheses and italics – by their coded names, which are the names used in the tables. For example, “net monthly income” (*net* in the database).

Additionally, most variables in the database were collected for both fathers and mothers. That is, “net monthly income” (*net*) exists in the database as *fnet* for fathers while *mnet* is found for mothers. To simplify the discussion which follows, these variables will be referred to without the *f* and *m* prefix. The discussion and tables will indicate whether they apply to mothers or fathers.

⁴ Two notes of explanation:

1. Both median and mean are reported in the table for the reader’s review; however, median values will be referenced throughout the discussion. Given that variables related to income do

cases, with a difference of over \$1400 of net income a month. The Administrative IVD cases display the lowest median income at \$1389 while the Direct Pay non-IVD shows the highest at \$2846 per month.

The differences in income are reflected in the variation in noncustodial fathers' order amounts, as would be expected from the Child Support Schedule. The median value of the order amount is \$327 for all noncustodial fathers. This amount represents the total amount the noncustodial father is ordered to pay in child support for all the children associated with this child support order; that is, it is not the median amount per child. Additionally, this value includes any deviations – upward or downward - from the presumptive amounts established by the Schedule.

Given the significant variation in income across the four strata, we would expect variation in the order amounts across the categories. Table I-A confirms this: Administrative IVD fathers are ordered to pay \$287 while Direct Pay non-IVD fathers are ordered to pay \$549.

For all noncustodial fathers, the order amount represents 19.0 percent (.1896 in Table I-A) of their monthly income. While some variation exists among the four strata, it is fairly small. The Administrative IVD cases are ordered to pay the highest percentage at 19.6 percent, while Court IVD orders are the smallest at 18.4 percent.

Thus, although the order amounts vary significantly, reflecting the differences in income among the strata, the percent of income ordered in child support does not. Thus, the proportion of income ordered in child support is fairly uniform across the subgroups, displaying neither income progressivity or regressivity.

How frequently and to what extent do orders deviate from the presumptive amount in the Child Support Schedule?

Table II-A provides information on the prevalence and amount of deviations for noncustodial fathers. The data indicate that deviations are common, occurring in almost one-third of the cases for noncustodial fathers. Specifically, 29.0 percent of the orders differ from the presumptive amounts (as seen in Table II-A, in the mean value of .2896 for “Fwhdev” column, “Total” row). The vast majority (85.1 percent) of the deviations are downward (that is, the deviation reduces the order from the presumptive amount).⁵ The median value of the downward deviations is \$113. This is a relatively large magnitude: it represents a 32.2 percent reduction in the order amount.⁶ Those

not conform to a normal distribution, the median provides a better measure of central tendency than does the mean value.

2. The tables presented throughout the body of this report include “nonzero” values only. Thus, \$1757 is the median value of noncustodial fathers' net income among those who had nonzero income in their order. Inclusion of zero values may mislead the interpretation of the findings and are thus excluded here. However, those orders with zero income may be of significant concern and are examined separately later in this report. (Additionally, Table I-A is replicated in the Appendix with the inclusion of zero values for those readers who may be interested. This is also the case for noncustodial mothers' Table I-B and I-B Appendix.
3. Throughout the report, dollar values will be rounded to the nearest dollar and percentages will be rounded to the nearest decimal point.

⁵ This number is not shown in the table, but is calculated from the data there: as shown in the table, 835 orders involve a downward deviation; this number divided by the total of 981 (835 downward and 146 upward) equals 85.1 percent.

⁶ This is not shown in the table. It was calculated by adding the downward deviation to the order amount for each order with a downward deviation, indicating what the order would have been without the deviation.

15 percent of the orders with upward deviations have a median value of \$110, resulting in a 20.4 percent increase in their order amounts.⁷

Of particular interest is the substantial variation among the four strata: the most striking variation is seen among the Administrative IV-D cases. Only 14.0 percent of these entail a deviation. This differs markedly from the other categories, even within the other IV-D category, where 30.3 percent have a deviation in their order. Among the Direct Pay and Payment Service non-IVD cases, 42.5 percent and 38.0 percent deviated, respectively. The significant variation in deviation rates suggests that different award-establishment processes are occurring for the Administrative IV-D cases than the other strata.

In Table III-A, the reasons for deviations (for noncustodial fathers) are shown. As this table indicates, no one reason predominates in explaining why deviations occur. The most frequent reason, accounting for 18.1 percent of the deviations, is because the noncustodial father's income is less than the AFDC Needs Standard. The next most common reason, accounting for 17.5 percent of deviations, is a result of using the Whole Family Approach in establishing the order amount. Other common reasons arise because of residential credits (13.3 percent), mutual agreement (11.8 percent), and child support from other relationships (9.1 percent).⁸

How deviations were determined

A case was determined to have deviated from the presumptive amount in the Child Support Schedule if both of the following conditions held:

1. the variable "amount of deviation" (deviati in the database) was nonzero and
2. the variable "reason for deviation" (devreas in the database) was nonmissing.

Imposing both of the above conditions resulted in a loss of some potential cases which might have involved a deviation. For noncustodial fathers, a total 56 cases were not assigned a deviation because both conditions did not hold; specifically, 51 cases indicated a deviation "reason" but no "amount of deviation" and the other 5 cases gave an "amount" but no "reason." For noncustodial mothers, 15 cases were not assigned a deviation because they indicated a "reason" but not an "amount."

Prior to the analysis reported here, the "amount of deviation" variable had been screened to determine whether the actual order amount differed from the presumptive amount in the Schedule simply from the process of rounding to a whole or even number. Such rounding would result in a nominal deviation; such a nominal deviation, however, would not constitute a conscious decision to deviate from the Schedule and therefore these nominal deviations are not included in this analysis.⁹

The deviation was then divided by the total, for a result of a median 32.2 percent decrease in the order amount (among those with a downward deviation).

⁷ In this case, the upward deviation was subtracted from the order amount for each case with an upward deviation, to determine what the order would have been without the upward deviation. The deviation is then divided by the total, for a median increase in the order of 20.4 percent (for those with an upward deviation).

⁸ As would be expected, a breakdown of "Reasons for deviation" by the four strata displays wide variation. For example, 90 percent of the deviations due to "Income less than AFDC standard" are found in the IV-D categories (52 percent in Court IV-D and 38 percent in Administrative IV-D). Table II-A in the Appendix provides this information. (Table II-B, in the Appendix, provides the same data for noncustodial mothers.)

⁹ Note, however, that some deviation amounts included in the analysis are nonetheless very small: as Table II-A shows, the minimum value for a downward deviation is only \$1.00 and for the upward deviation only \$2.73. To determine the prevalence of these small deviations, the data were examined for the percent which deviate upward or downward by less than \$5.00: this was true for only 10 (1.0 percent) of the cases.

How do the findings for noncustodial fathers compare to those of noncustodial mothers?

Tables I-B, II-B, and III-B present the findings for the cases where the noncustodial parent is the mother. A comparison between mothers and fathers shows that substantial differences exist. Table I-B shows that for all noncustodial mothers median net monthly income is \$1060, indicating that their income is only 60.3 percent of what fathers earn.¹⁰ Variation exists among the subgroups, as we observed with noncustodial fathers, but to a lesser degree: Direct Pay cases have incomes of \$1523 compared to \$994 for Administrative IVD mothers. As would be expected given their lower incomes, noncustodial mothers have lower order amounts: the median value for all mothers is \$161. Again, although variation among the subgroups is observed, it is not as wide as for fathers: Payment Service Only cases are ordered to pay the highest amount at \$209, while Administrative IVD order amounts are \$143.

An important distinction between noncustodial mothers and fathers is observed in the “percent of income” variable. Recall that fathers’ median value is 19.0 percent; the comparable value for mothers is 15.2 percent. The explanation for this finding cannot be due to the lower income of mothers per se, because the variable measures the order amount as a percent of income. Similar to the fathers’ cases, the Administrative IV-D cases are ordered to pay the highest percentage of their income: 16.6 percent compared to 14.1 percent for the Direct Pay orders, which pay the lowest percent of income.

The differences between mothers’ and fathers’ awards deserves scrutiny in further analyses of the database. Table II-B, however, may provide some initial information. Mothers are not more likely to have a deviation in their order: 26.4 percent of the mothers’ orders (compared to almost 29.0% of fathers’) involved a deviation. However, the amount of the downward deviation may provide a partial explanation for the differences in orders of mothers and fathers: the median downward deviation for mothers is \$134, which represents a 54.4 percent reduction in their order. (Recall that fathers’ deviations were considered significant at a 32.2 percent reduction in their orders.) The reasons for deviations (for noncustodial mothers) are given in Table III-B. The results are similar to those of noncustodial fathers, in that similar reasons are most likely for the deviation (specifically, the most common are: Income Less than AFDC, Residential Credit, and Whole Family Approach). However, while no one reason predominated for noncustodial fathers, this is not the case for noncustodial mothers: almost half of the deviations (45.3 percent) arise from a singular cause: their incomes are below the poverty level (the AFDC Needs Standard).

How do the findings change based on the number of children in the order?

The average number of children in each order is 1.43 with 66.7 percent of the orders involving one child and 25.3 percent with two children.¹¹ Thus, 92.0 percent of the orders have one or two children. The number of children in the non-IVD cases is slightly greater at an average of 1.59 children, compared to the IV-D cases with an average of 1.34 children.

¹⁰ This may be compared to the familiar female-to-male income ratio from the Census Bureau, which is 71.2 percent. The lower ratio (of 60 percent) in our data base is likely explained by two factors: 1) the Census data only include full-time, year-round workers; we do not have labor force participation data for the sample, but it is likely that many of the cases do not meet that criterion, and 2) the Census data include married, single, divorced, and separated men and women, while the data here are based only on those involving child support orders and thus likely to display different income patterns. (Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Current Population Reports*, Consumer Income Series P-60, 1999.)

¹¹ The data here represent the number of children involved for a *given* child support order: *multiple orders* exist for some households. Thus, the number of children in a given household may differ from the number of children in a given order.

Tables IV-A and B show the income, order amounts, and order as a percent of income for noncustodial fathers and mothers, respectively. The tables here, however, provide that data categorized by the number of children in the order. As Table IV-A shows as the number of children increases both the dollar amount of the order and the order as a percent of income increases. For one child, the median order amount is \$285, which represents (as seen in the last column) 17.8 percent of net income. For two children, the amount rises to \$531 or 25.0 percent of income. These findings are consistent with the Schedule, which takes into account the fact that additional children entail additional costs, while at the same time recognizing that two children are not twice as costly as one. That is, the Schedule has incorporated the economies of scale associated with larger families. While a similar pattern is shown for noncustodial mothers in Table IV-B, it is much less pronounced. The median order amount rises for the second child in an order, but only by \$13; the order as a percent of income rises, but only from 15.2 percent to 17.8. The higher award amounts for fathers associated with the second child may reflect, not only the costs associated with an additional child, but also the much higher net income associated with those orders: father's net income for the one child orders is seen in Table IV-A to be \$1563 compared to \$2289 for those with two children. The orders for noncustodial mothers show only a very small increase in income between the one child and two child cases: \$1042 compared to \$1104.

Tables V-A (for noncustodial fathers) and B (for noncustodial mothers) provide the findings for deviation rates and amounts, categorized by number of children in the order. In reviewing this table, note that, given most orders involve only one or two children, the cell sizes become quite small as we examine various subgroupings. Our purpose here is to determine if deviation rates and amounts vary by the number of children in the order. While the overall deviation rate for noncustodial fathers is 29.2 percent, we see here that deviation rate is generally higher for those orders with more than one child. While the deviation rate for orders involving one child is 27.6 percent, for orders with two or three children the deviation rate is 33.0 percent. Similarly, the amount of the downward deviation steadily increases as the number of children increases. Thus, both the likelihood of a deviation and the amount increases with the number of children in the order.¹² This pattern is also observed for noncustodial mothers, as shown in Table V-B.

What are the different types of orders in the database and how do they carry among the four strata?

We begin here with an overview of order types found in the database and their representation in the four strata.¹³ The most common order type in the database overall is a child support order prompted by a divorce, accounting for 27.8 percent of all orders. Most of these (65.5 percent) are in the Direct Pay category, and divorces account for 77.8 percent of the Direct Pay caseload. (The bulk of the remaining Direct Pay orders were "Modifications, Court Order" accounting for 14.6 percent of the Direct Pay caseload.)

The second most common order type is "Administrative Notice Default," representing 21.4 percent of all orders in the database and they account for 63.1 percent of the Administrative IV-D caseload.

The next most likely order type is "Modification, Court Order," accounting for 14.9 percent of all orders in the database. The data show 61.1 percent of the Modifications are Court IV-D cases, and these represent 28.1 percent of the Court IV-D caseload. Another 23.0 percent (of the modifications) are Direct Pay, and (as noted above) modifications account for 14.6 percent of the

¹² Interestingly, the amount of the upward deviation also increases as the number of children increases. However, the cell sizes involved here are small.

¹³ The tables displaying these counts may be found in the Appendices: Tables III and IV.

Direct Pay orders. Finally, 15.9 percent of the modifications are Payment Service Only, and these account for 22.9 percent of the Payment Service caseload.

Another order type appearing with some frequency is “Judgment, Paternity” which comprises 11.0 percent of all orders. Virtually all (98.7 percent) of the “Judgment, Paternity” orders are Court IV-D cases, and these represent 33.5 percent of their caseload. Additionally, “Paternity Orders” (as distinct from “Judgment, Paternity” orders) comprise 7.1 percent of the orders, 84.0 percent of them are handled within Court-IVD, representing 18.3 percent of their caseload.

Thus, this review of the data indicates that the four categories differ significantly in the types of orders they establish.

How do the findings vary according to the type of order?

Table VI-A presents the breakdown of noncustodial fathers’ income, order amount, and order as a percent of income by order type.¹⁴ As would be expected, substantial variation in income and order amount exists among the different order types. Those with the highest income values (greater than \$2000 per month) are divorces, modifications by court order, and “other court orders.” As mandated in the Schedule, these also have the largest order amounts. The lowest income values (less than \$1300 per month) are the two order types involving paternity (“paternity order” and “judgment/paternity”). Variation in the order amount as a percent of income also exists, although the pattern is less discernable. Ordered to pay the largest proportion of income are divorce (20.7 percent) and temporary court orders (21.0 percent; however, this latter category has relatively few observations.). The smallest percent of income is ordered in agreed settlement orders (16.6 percent). The two types of paternity orders are required to pay close to 18 percent of net income. The Administrative Default orders (recall these comprise the second most common order type overall) are ordered to pay 19.9 percent of net income.

Table VI-B presents the same data for noncustodial mothers. Cell sizes for some of these order types are quite small and thus the findings may not be representative. One finding that stands out, particularly given the previous findings about Administrative IV-D cases, is that the Administrative Notice Default cases are ordered to pay the highest percent of income (17.6 percent compared to the median for all order types of 15.2 percent).¹⁵

How do the findings vary by region of the state?

To further analyze the data, the orders were examined by “Region.” Depending upon the county where the order originated, the case was assigned to one of three regions within the state: Urban West, Non-urban West, or East. The Urban West accounts for the highest proportion of the orders (45.7 percent), while 22.6 percent are from the Non-urban West and 31.7 percent are from the East.¹⁶

Tables VII-A (for noncustodial fathers) and B (for noncustodial mothers) display income, order amount, and order as a percent of income categorized by region. According to the data for

¹⁴ Six order types whose number of observations were eleven or less were combined into the order type listed as “Misc.”

¹⁵ Similar to previous findings in this report, “Administrative Notice Default” orders (for noncustodial fathers) are much less likely to entail a deviation: only 14.7 percent entail a deviation, compared to the median deviation rate of 29 percent. Deviations by order type are not provided in the body of this report, given many small cell sizes. They may be found, however, in the Appendices: Table VA (for noncustodial fathers) and VB (for noncustodial mothers).

¹⁶ County assignment to region is shown in Table VI in the Appendix.

noncustodial fathers, as would be expected, the Urban West region orders enjoy the highest incomes, with a median value of \$2073 per month, while the East region cases show the lowest incomes at \$1428. The order amounts differ according to the income values, as established in the Schedule. The orders in the Urban West, however, are also higher in terms of their proportion of income (19.7 percent) compared to the orders in the East at 18.1 percent. A similar pattern (although lower values overall) is shown in Table VII-B for noncustodial mothers.

Tables VIII-A and VIII-B show the deviation rates and amounts categorized by region. Small variation is seen in deviation rates by region: orders emanating from the Non-urban West have a somewhat higher deviation rate at 29.6 percent than the Urban West at 29.3 percent, while those in the East have the lowest at 28.0 percent. As we noted before, the vast majority of deviations result in a reduction in the order amount, so we will focus our attention on those. While the dollar amount of the deviation does not vary much by region (for example, the median downward deviation in the Urban West is \$117 compared to \$123 in the East), the percentage the deviation represents of the order varies somewhat more substantially. That is, the \$117 deviation is a 29.9 percent reduction in Urban West orders, while the \$123 translates into a 36.0 percent reduction for orders in the East.¹⁷

More substantial variation in deviation rates by region is shown in the data for noncustodial mothers. Table VIII-B shows that mothers in the Non-urban West are much more likely to receive a deviation than mothers in the Urban West: their deviation rates are 30.1 percent and 24.0 percent, respectively. The amount of the deviation is again substantial, representing a reduction in the order amount of 50.0 percent in the East and 63.1 percent in both regions of the West.¹⁸

How many orders are based on imputed income values? How do those orders vary from those based on actual income figures?

Income imputation for the purpose of establishing child support orders is common: 37.8 percent of the orders for noncustodial fathers are based on imputed income values.¹⁹ Table IX-A shows that the median imputed income for noncustodial fathers is \$1363, compared to \$2082 for those orders based on actual income. While the order amount is correspondingly lower for those using imputed income, the proportion of income ordered is similar: 18.4 percent for imputed income orders compared to 19.3 percent for those derived from actual income.

Table X-A shows the findings on how income imputation varies among the four strata for noncustodial fathers. Given their caseload, it is not surprising that imputation is much more

¹⁷ These figures are not shown in the table.

¹⁸ These figures are not shown in the table.

¹⁹ The imputation rates and corresponding analyses are based on an "imputation estimator." Initial analysis had been based on whether or not a checkbox had specifically been checked as "imputed income." Using that information to determine imputation resulted in an overall imputation rate of approximately 28 percent. This rate was known to be "far too small" and was deemed to result from the fact that frequently the checkbox was simply left blank. To arrive at a more accurate estimate of imputation, the following method was employed: 1) The net incomes associated with all those observations specifically identified as imputed (by the checkbox on the form) were listed; 2) For that set of incomes, the frequency of occurrence in the entire database was determined; 3) The frequency of occurrence overall was compared to the frequency of imputation; 4) If the net income figure appeared as "imputed" more than 1/3 of the time, a case associated with that income figure was considered "imputed." Thus, all cases specifically marked as imputed are counted as imputed *plus all those cases with income figures that frequently appear as imputed incomes are also counted as imputed.*

common in the IV-D categories than within the non-IVD categories: 50.3 percent of the IV-D orders utilize imputed income compared to 28.0 percent of the non-IVD.²⁰

In the Direct Pay category, we see that imputed income is \$2371 compared to \$2954 for actual income. Thus, median imputed income in the Direct Pay category is 80.3 percent of median actual income, as compared to 74.7 percent in the PSO subgroup. Median imputed income is a similar proportion of median actual income in the IV-D categories: for the Court IV-D orders, imputed income is 74.9 percent of actual income, and in the Administrative IV-D orders, imputed is 80.8 percent of actual income.

In terms of the percent of income the order represents, within the non-IVD categories, orders based on imputed income are ordered to pay larger proportion of income: approximately 21 percent of income for imputed orders compared to 19.0 percent for orders based on actual income. Within the IV-D categories, the reverse holds: imputed income orders are a smaller fraction of income than actual income orders. For example, within the Administrative IVD category, imputed income orders are 18 percent of income compared to 21 percent for actual income orders.

The last issue to be addressed with respect to imputation is how it affects the deviation rate among the categories. Deviations are more likely among imputed income orders than actual orders in three of the four subgroups. As shown in Table XI-A, the deviation rate for Direct Pay orders which utilize imputed income is 45.0 percent (compared to 41.6 percent for those using actual income). The other non-IVD category, PSO, is the only one where the deviation rate is lower for the imputed income orders, but only slightly so: 36.9 percent for those based on imputed income compared to 38.4 percent for actual income orders. (However, in that category - and that category only - the amount of the deviation (downward) is greater for the imputed income orders (\$190) than for the actual income ones (\$143). Given the small cell sizes in that subgroup, these results may not be representative.)

Income imputation is as likely among noncustodial mothers as fathers: 38.4 percent of the noncustodial mothers' orders are based on imputed income (compared to 37.8 for noncustodial fathers). The next set of tables (IXB, XB, and XIB) provides the findings on imputation for noncustodial mothers and display similar trends to those of noncustodial fathers. Table IX-B indicates that the values for net income, order amount, and order as a percent of income are less for orders with imputed income compared to those based on actual income. Specifically, for orders based on actual income, median actual income equals \$1209 compared to imputed income of \$977; order amount based on actual income is \$222 compared to \$171 for imputed income orders; the order amount as a percent of income is 15.3 percent for actual income orders in contrast to 15.2 percent for imputed ones.

Table X-B shows the findings on how income imputation varies among the four strata. In orders for noncustodial mothers, as observed for noncustodial fathers, income imputation is more common within the IV-D orders than the nonIV-D orders. The difference between these categories, however, is not as large as that observed for noncustodial fathers. Just over sixty percent (61.4%) of the IV-D orders are based on imputed income compared to slightly less than sixty percent (57.7 %) of the non-IVD orders.²¹ We need to be aware, however, as we examine these cases that the cell sizes are becoming fairly small.

²⁰ These are not shown in the tables, but are calculated from the data there: 298/1066 of the non-IVD are imputed; 1100/2185 of the IV-D.

²¹ These percentages are not given in Table X-B, but may be calculated from the number of observations listed there.

As with noncustodial fathers, in all categories, imputed income is less than actual income. However, the proportion of imputed income to actual income displays a different pattern for mothers than fathers. For example, in the Direct Pay category, median imputed income is just over fifty percent (56.2%) of actual income for noncustodial mothers, contrasted to 80.3 percent for fathers. In the Administrative IVD category, median imputed income is a very high 91.7 percent of median actual income (compared to 80.8 percent for fathers). Another finding with respect to the Administrative IV-D orders compared to the other categories is that for all other categories the order amount and the percent of income is less for the imputed orders than those based on actual income; in the Administrative orders, however, the order amount and percent of income is higher for the imputed income cases than the ones using actual income.

Deviation rates and income imputation for noncustodial mothers are shown in Table XI-B. As we have observed in earlier sections of this analysis, deviation rates vary significantly by category. Within the non-IVD categories, orders based on imputed income are more likely to include a deviation than those based on actual income and, as we have seen earlier, overall the non-IV strata are much more likely to deviate. Compared to the findings for noncustodial fathers, two reversals are observed: 1) for noncustodial mothers, the PSO orders based on imputed income are more likely to deviate than those based on actual income, and 2) the Court IV-D orders are much less likely to deviate when based on imputed income: 15.6 percent deviation rate for imputed income orders compared to 34.2 percent for actual income. (The caution regarding small cell sizes is particularly advised here.) The amount of the downward deviation (throughout our analysis, the vast majority of the cases) is smaller for imputed orders than actual orders within the non-IVD, while the deviation is larger for the imputed orders than actual orders in the IVD cases.

Is there a significant relationship between the custodial parent's income and the proportion of income ordered to pay in child support?

The proportion of income a noncustodial father is ordered to pay in child support falls slightly as income rises. Although the relationship is significant at the .00 level, it is very weak: the Pearson Correlation coefficient is $-.072$.²² This finding is visually reinforced by the scatter plot diagram of Figure One (included in the Tables), showing the dense clustering of orders with some outliers. It is to those outliers – those orders which represent a very small or very large proportion of net income and those orders based on very high or very low incomes - that we now turn.

Child Support Order Exceeds 45 percent of Income

One of the limitations standards established by the Washington State Child Support Schedule is that “neither parent’s total child support obligation may exceed 45 percent of net income” (without clear justification).²³ Among forty-one orders (1.2 percent of all noncustodial fathers), the percent of income ordered in child support exceeds 45 percent of income.²⁴ As Table XII shows these orders are associated with lower median incomes compared to the rest (\$1441 compared to \$1800). The median order amounts for those with awards greater than 45 percent of income are more than double the amount of other orders: \$758 compared to \$338.

Table XII also that the deviation rate is similar both groups: 30.5 for those with orders less than 45 percent of income compared to 31.7 percent for those in excess of 45 percent of income. While caution must be exercised given the very small cell sizes, nine cases with an upward deviation

²² The relationship is positive but weaker for noncustodial mothers (.022) and insignificant.

²³ WSCSS-Schedule 09-01-2000, page 2.

²⁴ Additionally, three cases involved noncustodial mothers whose orders exceeded 45 percent of income. Given their small numbers, they are not analyzed further here.

display very large upward deviations: a median value of \$539 and a mean value of \$818. Such large upward deviations have not been observed elsewhere in this analysis.

Further analysis²⁵ of these orders shows that those with an order greater than 45 percent of income involve a greater number of children (on average, 2.32) compared to 1.40 children for the remaining orders. The majority of these orders (62.8 percent) are established within the IV-D categories (41.5 percent by Court IVD and 19.5 percent by Admin. IVD); 29.3 percent are in the Direct Pay category. Almost half (48.8 percent) of these orders arose because of a divorce. These orders are less likely to be based on imputed income values (31.7 percent of them compared to 42.9 percent for the rest). The vast majority (80.5 percent) originate in the West (61.0 percent in the Urban West and 19.5 percent in the Non-urban West). It is difficult to discern from the information available whether clear justification was shown in establishing these orders in excess of 45 percent of income.

Combined Income Greater than \$5000 and \$7000

The limitation standards of the Child Support Schedule state that “the economic table is presumptive for combined monthly net incomes up to and including five thousand dollars. When combined monthly net income exceeds five thousand dollars, support shall not be set at an amount lower than the presumptive amount of support set for combined monthly net incomes of five thousand dollars unless the court finds reason to deviate below that amount. The economic table is advisory but not presumptive for combined monthly net income that exceeds five thousand dollars.” The limitation standards continue regarding combined income greater than seven thousand dollars, “the court may set support at an advisory amount of support set for combined monthly net incomes between five thousand and seven thousand dollars or the court may exceed the advisory amount of support for combined monthly net income of seven thousand dollars upon written findings of fact.”²⁶

There are 599 cases where the combined monthly income exceeds \$5000; in 89.1 percent of these orders the noncustodial parent is the father. For these cases, according to the instructions from the Schedule cited above, we would expect these fathers to pay at least their proportion of the obligation associated with the amount set for combined incomes of five thousand dollars. To determine whether their orders were consistent with those amounts, the data need to be analyzed by number and age of children and then, based on that information, the noncustodial father’s share of the basic obligation from the Schedule must be compared to the actual order amount. For example, according to the Schedule, if combined net monthly income is \$5000, the basic obligation for one child, less than twelve years old, is \$738. If the father’s share of family income is .7, then his proportion of the obligation would be \$517. Thus, if the instructions above are being applied correctly, we would expect that noncustodial fathers whose combined income exceeded \$5000 with one child less than 12 years old, would have an award no less than \$517.

The data show that for cases with one child less than 12 years old, the expected median order amount is a minimum of \$447. This compares to the actual median order amount for such cases of \$577. Similarly, for cases with one child between 12 and 18 years old, the expected median order amount is \$534 which compares to the actual median order for these cases of \$555. Thus, using this measure of central tendency, the instructions of the Schedule are being applied. The data were further analyzed to explore the variation around the median; this analysis showed that 22.6 percent

²⁵ The following data are not provided in a table, but are available upon request. Eight of these cases had notes in the file: two of these indicated that data had been transposed, three indicated that very large property and/or debt settlements were involved.

²⁶ WSCSS-Schedule 09-01-2000, page three.

of the noncustodial fathers with one child (with combined monthly income in excess of \$5000) were not ordered to pay the expected minimum.

For the orders involving two children, again the median expected minimum amount is less than the median actual amount (\$775 compared to \$839). However, there is a sizeable percentage which are not ordered to pay the minimum: 29.4 percent of the orders with two children were not ordered to pay the expected minimum amount.

This same type of analysis applies to those cases where combined monthly income exceeds \$7000. Of the 211 orders with such incomes, the father is the noncustodial parent in 91.6 percent of the cases. These cases represent 5.3 percent of all noncustodial fathers' orders. For those orders involving one child less than 12 years old, the expected minimum amount is \$488 compared to the actual median order amount of \$779. For those with one child over 12 years old, the expected minimum is \$569 compared to the actual median order amount of \$762. In 15.7 percent of the cases the father is not ordered to pay the expected minimum. Given their high incomes, it is not surprising that over 70 percent of those not ordered to pay the expected minimum are found in the non-IVD categories. For the orders involving two children, the expected minimum (\$791) is again less than actual order amount (\$1044), while 18.5 percent of the orders do not pay the expected minimum.

Income Below Six Hundred Dollars

A third limitation standard imposed by the Schedule pertains to those orders with combined monthly income of less than six hundred dollars. In these cases, "a support order of not less than twenty-five dollars per child per month shall be entered for each parent..." The database contains 171 orders (4.1 percent) where the combined monthly income is less than six hundred dollars. In 43 percent of these cases the noncustodial parent is the father. For those with one child, the median child support order is \$25 and, for those with two children, the median order amount is \$50. Thus, using this measure of central tendency, the Schedule's instructions are being followed. In 15 of the 74 cases (20.3 %), however, no child support is ordered. For those cases where the mother is the noncustodial parent, the actual median order amounts adhere to the Schedule's instructions. In 38 percent of the cases, however, no child support is ordered.

Child Support Order is Zero

In the analysis for those orders with combined income of less than six hundred dollars, we observed that for some noncustodial parents the child support order equals zero. This prompts the question as to how many noncustodial parents in general are not ordered to pay any child support.

There are 153 orders (4.7 percent) in the database where the noncustodial father's order amount is zero. The median income of these fathers is \$1388 (compared to the \$1795 for fathers with nonzero transfer payments).²⁷ A curious finding is that these fathers have a lower deviation rate than noncustodial fathers with nonzero order amounts: 18.3 percent have a deviation compared to 29.8 percent. However, the amount of the downward deviation is substantial and much larger than those with nonzero orders: \$203 compared to \$112.²⁸ Fathers with an order of zero are more likely to be Administrative IVD cases (49.0 percent of them compared to 26.9 percent of those with nonzero order amounts). Among order types, they are more likely to be "Judgment/Paternity" than

²⁷ Given these fathers' circumstances, the median incomes including zero values may be of interest. Twenty-seven of these fathers had zero net income; when those with zero incomes are included, the comparison becomes \$1219 median income for those with an order of zero compared to \$1747 for those with a nonzero order amount.

²⁸ Again, we did to be aware of small cell sizes: 25 fathers (with an order of zero) had a downward deviation.

their counterparts: 25.5 percent of them compared to 13.3 percent of the fathers with nonzero orders. They are also more likely to be an “Administrative” order: 15.0 percent of them compared to 2.5 percent of their counterparts. There is a small difference in the likelihood of relying on an imputed income figure rather than actual income values: 49.7 percent of them had imputed income compared to 41.2 percent of those with nonzero orders. Finally, these orders are more likely to originate in the East region of the state: 37.6 percent of the them compared to 30.4 percent of the orders with nonzero orders.

There are 87 cases (12.1 percent) where noncustodial mothers have orders equal to zero. Many of them (n=38) have incomes of zero. Including those with net incomes equal to zero, the median income for those noncustodial mothers with a zero transfer amount is \$744 compared to \$1006 for those mothers with nonzero transfers. Like the noncustodial fathers ordered to pay nothing, these mothers have a lower deviation rate (17.2 percent) than noncustodial mothers with nonzero order amounts (21.5 percent) and the amount of their downward deviation is slightly greater, at \$186 compared to \$178 for those with nonzero orders. Most of these orders (83.9 percent) are in the Administrative IVD category. Regarding “Type of order,” like the noncustodial fathers, these are more likely to be “Administrative Orders” (11.5 percent compared to 5.5 percent of mothers with nonzero orders). The most likely order type for these cases is “Administrative Notice Default,” which accounts for 44.8 percent of them. (That is comparable to the figure of 43.0 percent for those mothers with nonzero orders.) Like the noncustodial fathers, these orders are less likely to be based on imputed income: 34.5 percent of them use imputed income compared to 56.2 percent of those mothers with nonzero orders. Regarding the region of the state, these orders are somewhat more likely to be from the Urban West (51.2 percent) than their counterparts (44.2 percent) and somewhat less likely to be from the East (32.1 percent compared to 36.3 percent).

Orders based on Zero Income

The final subgroup to be analyzed is those orders where the noncustodial parent has zero income. These orders have comprised a portion of each of the previous two sections. (That is, some of those with combined incomes less than six hundred have incomes of zero, and some of those with order amounts of zero have incomes of zero.) Here, however, we will examine, as a distinct subgroup, all those orders where the noncustodial parent’s income is zero.

There are 114 orders (3.5 percent) where the noncustodial father has zero income. The median transfer amount for these fathers is \$25, suggesting adherence to the Schedule’s instructions that a minimum order of \$25 per child will be established. However, as seen in the findings above regarding incomes less than \$600, some cases have order amounts of zero: this is true for 24 percent of the orders where the noncustodial father has zero income. Their deviation rate is lower (12.3 percent) compared to orders with nonzero income (with a 29.9 percent deviation rate). A majority (60.5 percent) of these noncustodial fathers with zero income are Court IVD orders (compared to 38.3 percent of those with nonzero incomes) and 29.8 percent are Administrative IVD (compared to 27.9 percent of those with nonzero incomes). The most common order type for these cases is “Judgment/Paternity” which comprises 24.6 percent of them (compared to 13.5 percent of those cases where the noncustodial father has nonzero income). The other most common order types for these orders are: Administrative Notice Default (15.8 percent of these orders) and Modification/Court (19.3 percent). Perhaps the most striking difference is found in the likelihood of imputation: only 7.0 percent of orders based on zero income are imputed compared to 42. percent of those based on nonzero incomes. Finally, in terms of region, little variation exists: 42.7 percent of those with zero income are from the Urban West compared to 45.9 percent for those with nonzero income; 20.7 percent for zero incomes compared to 23.7 percent are from the Non-Urban West; and 36.7 percent of those with zero incomes originate in the East compared to 30.4 of those with nonzero incomes.

There are 112 noncustodial mothers with zero income (representing 15.6 percent of all orders involving noncustodial mothers). The median value of the order amount for these cases with zero income is \$25; again, however, many of them have order amounts of zero: 38 of the 112 cases have order amounts of zero. Similar to noncustodial fathers, their deviation rate is much lower: 10.7 percent for them compared to 30.2 percent for noncustodial mothers with nonzero income. The data indicate 83.9 percent of these cases are processed in the Administrative IVD category (compared to 58.6 percent of those orders where the noncustodial mother has nonzero income). Regarding the type of order, 66.1 percent of these orders are “Administrative Notice Default” (compared to 39.1 percent of those orders with nonzero income). These orders are much less likely to rely on imputed income: only 16.1 percent of the orders where the noncustodial mothers has zero income were based on imputed income compared to 60.4 percent of those where the noncustodial mother has nonzero income. Finally, little variation is displayed regarding where the order originates: 46.8 percent are from the Urban West (compared to 44.6 for the orders with nonzero income); 24.8 percent of the zero income orders are from the Non-Urban West compared to 18.2 percent of the orders with nonzero income; 28.4 percent of the zero income orders come from the East compared to 37.2 percent of those orders for noncustodial mothers with nonzero income.

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**Table I-A
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
for Noncustodial Fathers**

CATEGORY		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
DirPay	Median	2846.1500	549.1800	.1947
	Mean	3459.8282	641.5366	.2051
	N	709	712	708
	Minimum	500.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	2981.3059	453.5086	.1067
PSO	Median	2500.0000	483.1900	.1900
	Mean	2780.5623	529.7042	.2013
	N	357	351	344
	Minimum	520.00	13.96	.01
	Maximum	11500.00	1978.00	.53
	Std. Deviation	1483.2861	321.3998	9.188E-02
CourtIVD	Median	1408.0000	264.0000	.1839
	Mean	1656.6245	304.7329	.1940
	N	1249	1260	1196
	Minimum	40.00	10.00	.01
	Maximum	6840.00	2000.00	.82
	Std. Deviation	818.4146	209.5883	9.160E-02
AdminIVD	Median	1389.0000	286.5000	.1959
	Mean	1627.5032	326.6091	.2042
	N	936	896	870
	Minimum	65.00	24.00	.02
	Maximum	6105.00	1507.00	.99
	Std. Deviation	753.3310	203.4720	8.749E-02
Total	Median	1757.0000	327.0000	.1896
	Mean	2164.9172	409.8495	.2002
	N	3251	3219	3118
	Minimum	40.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	1785.3935	324.1550	9.427E-02

**Table II-A
Deviation Rates and Amounts
For Noncustodial Fathers**

CATEGORY		FWHDEV	FUPDEV	FDOWNDEV
DirPay	Median	.0000	139.6850	200.0000
	Mean	.4250	252.0370	260.9346
	N	713	106	197
	Minimum	.00	2.73	1.74
	Maximum	1.00	3957.92	1336.00
	Std. Deviation	.4947	440.4701	242.4073
PSO	Median	.0000	50.0000	157.5000
	Mean	.3798	126.0284	244.5756
	N	366	25	114
	Minimum	.00	7.48	7.00
	Maximum	1.00	666.00	958.50
	Std. Deviation	.4860	159.2155	220.7361
CourtIVD	Median	.0000	77.5000	93.5000
	Mean	.3025	80.6250	125.3429
	N	1329	8	394
	Minimum	.00	25.00	1.00
	Maximum	1.00	142.00	1036.10
	Std. Deviation	.4595	37.4697	114.2645
AdminIVD	Median	.0000	162.0000	85.0000
	Mean	.1399	133.7143	108.2055
	N	979	7	130
	Minimum	.00	25.00	4.00
	Maximum	1.00	229.00	411.00
	Std. Deviation	.3471	76.1702	77.9325
Total	Median	.0000	109.7050	113.0000
	Mean	.2896	215.3947	170.9431
	N	3387	146	835
	Minimum	.00	2.73	1.00
	Maximum	1.00	3957.92	1336.00
	Std. Deviation	.4537	385.5893	178.1942

Table III-A
Reasons for Deviations
For Noncustodial Fathers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Child Support From Other Relationships	89	9.1	9.1	9.1
	Possession of Wealth	5	.5	.5	9.6
	Tax Planning Considerations	13	1.3	1.3	10.9
	Extraordinary Debt	13	1.3	1.3	12.2
	Disparity in the Living Costs	3	.3	.3	12.5
	Special Needs of Disabled Children	2	.2	.2	12.7
	Medical, Educational or Psychological	9	.9	.9	13.7
	Residential Schedule Credit	130	13.3	13.3	26.9
	Blended Family Approach	53	5.4	5.4	32.3
	Child Support Exceeds 45%	7	.7	.7	33.0
	Income is Less than AFDC Needs Standard	178	18.1	18.1	51.2
	\$25 Presumption	7	.7	.7	51.9
	Income Greater Than \$5000	17	1.7	1.7	53.6
	No Reason Stated in Order	31	3.2	3.2	56.8
	Whole Family Approach	172	17.5	17.5	74.3
	Mutual Agreement	116	11.8	11.8	86.1
	ARVY Split Custody	16	1.6	1.6	87.8
	Other	120	12.2	12.2	100.0
	Total	981	100.0	100.0	

**Table I-B
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
for Noncustodial Mothers**

CATEGORY		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
DirPay	Median	1523.0000	164.0000	.1411
	Mean	1918.2366	235.4242	.1380
	N	124	133	124
	Minimum	120.62	17.00	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	1818.9271	244.4965	.1122
PSO	Median	1300.0000	208.7600	.1535
	Mean	1373.1234	204.1089	.1579
	N	65	66	58
	Minimum	400.00	25.00	.02
	Maximum	3405.81	630.20	.36
	Std. Deviation	585.7419	154.5591	8.488E-02
CourtIVD	Median	1075.0000	191.0000	.1526
	Mean	1323.4925	218.0056	.1502
	N	67	61	59
	Minimum	193.00	25.00	.02
	Maximum	3707.00	799.00	.40
	Std. Deviation	610.0066	168.8205	9.210E-02
AdminIVD	Median	993.5000	143.0000	.1658
	Mean	1147.6436	174.9942	.1647
	N	376	407	338
	Minimum	1.00	12.50	.01
	Maximum	3670.00	812.00	.69
	Std. Deviation	436.1698	141.6266	8.519E-02
Total	Median	1060.0000	161.0000	.1521
	Mean	1340.6683	193.8584	.1568
	N	632	667	579
	Minimum	1.00	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	958.9562	172.0493	9.268E-02

**Table II-B
Deviation Rates and Amounts
for Noncustodial Mothers**

CATEGORY		MWHDEV	MUPDEV	MDOWNDEV
DirPay	Median	1.0000	87.3650	212.1450
	Mean	.5414	216.7688	256.0711
	N	133	8	64
	Minimum	.00	25.00	7.10
	Maximum	1.00	800.00	1055.80
	Std. Deviation	.5002	266.3838	194.0860
PSO	Median	.0000		147.5200
	Mean	.4658		188.6165
	N	73		34
	Minimum	.00		21.82
	Maximum	1.00		856.02
	Std. Deviation	.5023		162.0039
CourtIVD	Median	.0000	249.0000	132.5000
	Mean	.2571	249.0000	156.1959
	N	70	1	17
	Minimum	.00	249.00	15.00
	Maximum	1.00	249.00	432.00
	Std. Deviation	.4402	.	117.8741
AdminIVD	Median	.0000	89.0000	99.0000
	Mean	.1588	89.0000	111.0043
	N	485	1	76
	Minimum	.00	89.00	8.00
	Maximum	1.00	89.00	409.00
	Std. Deviation	.3658	.	82.3543
Total	Median	.0000	94.3650	133.6500
	Mean	.2641	207.2150	177.4512
	N	761	10	191
	Minimum	.00	25.00	7.10
	Maximum	1.00	800.00	1055.80
	Std. Deviation	.4412	238.7870	157.5019

Table III-B
Reasons for Deviations
for Noncustodial Mothers

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Child Support From Other Relationships	2	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Tax Planning Considerations	1	.5	.5	1.5
	Extraordinary Debt	1	.5	.5	2.0
	Disparity in the Living Costs	3	1.5	1.5	3.5
	Medical, Educational or Psychological	4	2.0	2.0	5.5
	Residential Schedule Credit	27	13.4	13.4	18.9
	Blended Family Approach	5	2.5	2.5	21.4
	Child Support Exceeds 45%	3	1.5	1.5	22.9
	Income is Less than AFDC Needs Standard	91	45.3	45.3	68.2
	\$25 Presumption	3	1.5	1.5	69.7
	Income Greater Than \$5000	1	.5	.5	70.1
	No Reason Stated in Order	4	2.0	2.0	72.1
	Whole Family Approach	16	8.0	8.0	80.1
	Mutual Agreement	7	3.5	3.5	83.6
	ARVY Split Custody	5	2.5	2.5	86.1
	Other	28	13.9	13.9	100.0
	Total	201	100.0	100.0	

TABLE IV-A
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
By Number Of Children
For Noncustodial Fathers

NUMKIDS		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
1	Median	1563.1800	285.0000	.1775
	Mean	1936.3283	317.1385	.1758
	Minimum	40.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	29894.80	2000.00	1.00
	N	2133	2108	2042
2	Median	2288.5000	530.5000	.2491
	Mean	2700.9937	577.3212	.2371
	Minimum	68.00	13.96	.01
	Maximum	30976.00	2500.00	.90
	N	786	782	759
3	Median	2202.0000	691.1150	.3071
	Mean	2697.3464	720.1736	.2975
	Minimum	650.00	25.00	.02
	Maximum	31050.44	3000.00	.99
	N	195	188	188
4	Median	1872.5000	707.5000	.3481
	Mean	2432.0716	893.0645	.3550
	Minimum	718.00	100.00	.08
	Maximum	6691.00	5000.00	1.07
	N	38	38	38
5	Median	2673.0000	1097.2150	.4068
	Mean	2885.3000	1248.9650	.4023
	Minimum	1938.00	801.43	.35
	Maximum	5000.00	2000.00	.45
	N	5	4	4
Total	Median	1768.0000	331.0000	.1921
	Mean	2181.1837	414.8456	.2012
	Minimum	40.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	N	3157	3120	3031

TABLE IV-B
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
By Number Of Children
For Noncustodial Mothers

NUMKIDS		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
1	Median	1042.0000	160.0000	.1521
	Mean	1361.5268	178.3692	.1414
	Minimum	120.62	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.52
	N	388	407	359
2	Median	1103.5000	173.0950	.1784
	Mean	1308.1368	237.4162	.1926
	Minimum	193.00	17.00	.01
	Maximum	4305.83	1043.82	.73
	N	154	156	137
3	Median	1088.0000	143.0000	.1612
	Mean	1396.6402	234.0005	.1796
	Minimum	442.00	25.00	.01
	Maximum	5748.68	1037.00	.45
	N	56	61	54
4	Median	1068.0000	121.5000	.1521
	Mean	1534.2060	208.0817	.1702
	Minimum	822.00	34.49	.01
	Maximum	2917.00	600.00	.31
	N	5	6	5
5	Median	1010.0000	204.0000	.1975
	Mean	1010.0000	204.0000	.1975
	Minimum	940.00	125.00	.13
	Maximum	1080.00	283.00	.26
	N	2	2	2
Total	Median	1064.0000	171.0000	.1530
	Mean	1351.4518	198.6768	.1582
	Minimum	120.62	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	N	605	632	557

**TABLE V-A
Deviation Rates and Amounts
By Number Of Children
For Noncustodial Fathers**

NUMKIDS		FWHDEV	FUPDEV	FDOWNDEV
1	Median	.0000	100.4100	87.0000
	Mean	.2763	163.5309	115.8795
	N	2219	81	532
	Minimum	.00	3.00	1.00
	Maximum	1.00	1007.00	692.00
	Std. Deviation	.4472	190.1655	96.2999
2	Median	.0000	128.0000	173.0000
	Mean	.3276	217.0037	251.5044
	N	815	49	218
	Minimum	.00	2.73	3.10
	Maximum	1.00	1110.28	957.35
	Std. Deviation	.4696	252.9133	214.6766
3	Median	.0000	190.1750	247.2450
	Mean	.3367	292.8250	348.4125
	N	196	10	56
	Minimum	.00	22.06	12.00
	Maximum	1.00	1252.00	1089.42
	Std. Deviation	.4738	364.8739	287.1392
4	Median	.0000	196.1600	359.5000
	Mean	.2895	923.0400	440.9083
	N	38	5	6
	Minimum	.00	17.20	13.00
	Maximum	1.00	3957.92	1336.00
	Std. Deviation	.4596	1701.3888	489.5524
5	Median	.0000		
	Mean	.0000		
	N	5		
	Minimum	.00		
	Maximum	.00		
	Std. Deviation	.0000		
Total	Median	.0000	111.0000	113.0000
	Mean	.2924	216.7078	170.7296
	N	3273	145	812
	Minimum	.00	2.73	1.00
	Maximum	1.00	3957.92	1336.00
	Std. Deviation	.4549	386.5981	178.6608

**TABLE V-B
Deviation Rates and Amounts
By Number Of Children
For Noncustodial Mothers**

NUMKIDS		MWHDEV	MUPDEV	MDOWNDEV
1	Median	.0000	89.0000	104.0000
	Mean	.2241	131.0300	136.9713
	N	464	3	101
	Minimum	.00	25.00	7.10
	Maximum	1.00	279.09	609.00
	Std. Deviation	.4175	132.1564	108.4860
2	Median	.0000	232.7200	166.0000
	Mean	.3278	322.6100	212.5835
	N	180	4	55
	Minimum	.00	25.00	21.16
	Maximum	1.00	800.00	856.02
	Std. Deviation	.4707	350.2409	173.8695
3	Median	.0000	75.0000	209.5000
	Mean	.4462	129.5400	222.1488
	N	65	3	26
	Minimum	.00	64.62	15.00
	Maximum	1.00	249.00	876.00
	Std. Deviation	.5010	103.5855	163.6101
4	Median	.5000		323.0000
	Mean	.5000		561.8200
	N	6		3
	Minimum	.00		306.66
	Maximum	1.00		1055.80
	Std. Deviation	.5477		427.8772
5	Median	.0000		
	Mean	.0000		
	N	2		
	Minimum	.00		
	Maximum	.00		
	Std. Deviation	.0000		
Total	Median	.0000	94.3650	136.0000
	Mean	.2720	207.2150	178.3109
	N	717	10	185
	Minimum	.00	25.00	7.10
	Maximum	1.00	800.00	1055.80
	Std. Deviation	.4453	238.7870	157.6518

TABLE VI-A
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
by Type of Order
For Noncustodial Fathers

ORDTYPE		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
Divorce/Dissolution	Median	2545.0000	506.4700	.2071
	Mean	2996.0020	594.5887	.2165
	N	925	918	909
Temporary Court Order	Median	1720.0000	372.0000	.2101
	Mean	2070.3247	452.2843	.2247
	N	77	76	75
Paternity Order	Median	1206.0000	235.0000	.1771
	Mean	1540.8018	245.1900	.1730
	N	269	274	259
Other Court Order	Median	2271.0000	400.0000	.1792
	Mean	2682.0468	476.1076	.1964
	N	100	107	99
Administrative Order	Median	1449.5000	318.0000	.2040
	Mean	1728.5588	365.1405	.2159
	N	102	82	80
Consent Order	Median	1342.0000	284.5000	.1853
	Mean	1546.0196	330.2910	.2153
	N	51	48	47
Agreed Settlement	Median	1456.0000	289.0000	.1659
	Mean	1738.9343	315.3237	.1875
	N	137	126	122
Admin. Notice Default	Median	1381.0000	285.0000	.1985
	Mean	1600.2200	327.2449	.2054
	N	559	551	536
Mod-Court Order Only	Median	2123.0000	368.2450	.1783
	Mean	2506.9383	428.8289	.1913
	N	507	520	502
Judgement/Paternity	Median	1270.0000	239.0000	.1792
	Mean	1440.9931	245.8898	.1798
	N	435	426	402
09-710 Default	Median	1368.5000	285.0000	.2046
	Mean	1577.0323	306.4667	.2045
	N	62	63	61
Misc.	Median	1315.0000	266.0000	.2026
	Mean	1526.1481	288.8636	.1987
	N	27	28	26
Total	Median	1757.0000	327.0000	.1896
	Mean	2164.9172	409.8495	.2002
	N	3251	3219	3118

TABLE VI-B
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
by Order Type
For Noncustodial Mothers

ORDTYPE		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
Divorce/Dissolution	Median	1384.0000	171.5000	.1419
	Mean	1758.6093	227.2877	.1364
	N	129	124	120
Temporary Court Order	Median	963.0000	153.1000	.1103
	Mean	1547.0000	251.0533	.1271
	N	7	6	6
Paternity Order	Median	1217.0000	196.2100	.1719
	Mean	1156.1741	170.6689	.1483
	N	17	18	17
Other Court Order	Median	1200.0000	225.0000	.1488
	Mean	1547.9090	240.9195	.1516
	N	21	20	19
Administrative Order	Median	1046.0000	143.0000	.1521
	Mean	1212.5526	203.9728	.1870
	N	38	36	30
Consent Order	Median	1049.5000	190.0000	.1235
	Mean	1181.6538	184.9773	.1471
	N	26	22	22
Agreed Settlement	Median	1154.5000	150.0000	.1325
	Mean	1357.6897	168.4118	.1312
	N	58	51	46
Admin. Notice Default	Median	971.0000	143.0000	.1764
	Mean	1086.9447	171.8829	.1699
	N	253	298	240
Mod-Court Order Only	Median	1459.8150	201.0000	.1606
	Mean	1555.2271	227.2653	.1624
	N	78	87	75
Judgement/Paternity	Median	1277.5000	153.4400	8.703E-02
	Mean	1157.5000	145.6880	.1037
	N	4	5	4
Total	Median	1063.0000	161.0000	.1521
	Mean	1341.2541	193.8584	.1568
	N	631	667	579

TABLE VII-A
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
by Region
For Noncustodial Fathers

REGION		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
Urban West	Median	2073.0000	380.0000	.1969
	Mean	2554.3523	475.4453	.2052
	N	1459	1449	1402
	Minimum	40.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	2338.9957	376.3446	.1002
Non-urban West	Median	1717.0000	307.0000	.1879
	Mean	1928.8988	363.3506	.1937
	N	752	752	726
	Minimum	68.00	25.00	.02
	Maximum	11432.00	2500.00	.74
	Std. Deviation	1057.9136	259.8281	8.464E-02
East	Median	1427.5000	280.0000	.1812
	Mean	1772.8149	345.6355	.1966
	N	996	974	948
	Minimum	65.00	17.00	.01
	Maximum	10653.00	2000.00	.79
	Std. Deviation	1050.8253	262.7297	9.154E-02
Total	Median	1750.0000	327.0000	.1892
	Mean	2164.9690	409.0737	.1998
	N	3207	3175	3076
	Minimum	40.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	1795.1972	324.7928	9.420E-02

TABLE VII-B
Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
by Region
For Noncustodial Mothers

REGION		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
Urban West	Median	1222.0000	188.0000	.1674
	Mean	1519.6679	229.5354	.1675
	N	275	285	249
	Minimum	1.00	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	1275.2606	201.0363	.1036
Non-urban West	Median	1015.0000	143.0000	.1526
	Mean	1245.6436	159.8962	.1449
	N	115	130	105
	Minimum	299.00	25.00	.01
	Maximum	4305.83	693.03	.40
	Std. Deviation	614.8529	142.5491	8.622E-02
East	Median	979.5000	143.0000	.1521
	Mean	1187.8599	169.6395	.1484
	N	230	240	213
	Minimum	193.00	25.00	.01
	Maximum	4466.66	761.25	.44
	Std. Deviation	563.8770	140.8889	7.988E-02
Total	Median	1060.0000	161.0000	.1521
	Mean	1345.7508	193.7673	.1562
	N	620	655	567
	Minimum	1.00	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	965.2415	172.6608	9.252E-02

**TABLE VIII-A
Deviation Rates and Amounts
by Region
For Noncustodial Fathers**

REGION		FWHDEV	FUPDEV	FDOWNDEV
Urban West	Median	.0000	148.5150	117.0000
	Mean	.2931	286.2795	181.6203
	N	1518	84	361
	Minimum	.00	2.73	1.00
	Maximum	1.00	3957.92	1089.42
	Std. Deviation	.4554	483.3282	196.9019
Non-urban West	Median	.0000	140.5000	101.8300
	Mean	.2964	167.3755	153.8560
	N	786	22	211
	Minimum	.00	3.00	10.00
	Maximum	1.00	735.51	1336.00
	Std. Deviation	.4570	169.0544	163.5123
East	Median	.0000	58.0000	122.7600
	Mean	.2799	95.4783	172.0720
	N	1036	35	255
	Minimum	.00	5.68	3.10
	Maximum	1.00	614.34	1036.10
	Std. Deviation	.4492	118.9859	162.6980
Total	Median	.0000	111.0000	113.0000
	Mean	.2898	220.3651	171.5924
	N	3340	141	827
	Minimum	.00	2.73	1.00
	Maximum	1.00	3957.92	1336.00
	Std. Deviation	.4537	391.3662	178.7711

**TABLE VIII-B
Deviation Rates and Amounts
by Region
For Noncustodial Mothers**

REGION		MWHDEV	MUPDEV	MDOWNDEV
Urban West	Median	.0000	89.0000	165.0000
	Mean	.2402	242.6314	191.8855
	N	333	7	73
	Minimum	.00	25.00	8.00
	Maximum	1.00	800.00	856.02
	Std. Deviation	.4279	276.2522	160.6625
Non-urban West	Median	.0000	99.7300	113.0000
	Mean	.3014	124.5767	192.0593
	N	146	3	41
	Minimum	.00	25.00	13.00
	Maximum	1.00	249.00	1055.80
	Std. Deviation	.4604	114.0483	220.9859
East	Median	.0000		131.8500
	Mean	.2772		156.8185
	N	267		74
	Minimum	.00		12.00
	Maximum	1.00		433.79
	Std. Deviation	.4484		105.4205
Total	Median	.0000	94.3650	133.3250
	Mean	.2654	207.2150	178.1204
	N	746	10	188
	Minimum	.00	25.00	8.00
	Maximum	1.00	800.00	1055.80
	Std. Deviation	.4419	238.7870	158.1738

**TABLE IX-A
Income Imputation
For Noncustodial Fathers**

Imputation		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
Actual	Median	2081.8800	399.0000	.1932
	Mean	2461.1110	474.0811	.2024
	N	1853	1797	1797
	Minimum	40.00	10.00	.01
	Maximum	31050.44	3020.00	.90
	Std. Deviation	1885.0418	327.7582	9.566E-02
Imputed	Median	1363.0000	264.0000	.1835
	Mean	1772.3228	349.8164	.1972
	N	1398	1321	1321
	Minimum	500.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	30976.00	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	1560.2648	300.8900	9.229E-02
Total	Median	1757.0000	337.0000	.1896
	Mean	2164.9172	421.4340	.2002
	N	3251	3118	3118
	Minimum	40.00	.62	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	1785.3935	322.5053	9.427E-02

TABLE X-A
Income Imputation by Category
For Noncustodial Fathers

CATEGORY	Imputation		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
DirPay	Actual	Median	2954.0800	569.5000	.1896
		Mean	3569.6072	654.9883	.2004
		N	520	522	520
	Imputed	Median	2370.5800	513.0400	.2080
		Mean	3157.7908	604.5799	.2181
		N	189	190	188
PSO	Actual	Median	2677.9150	494.8250	.1872
		Mean	2910.5725	541.1057	.1996
		N	248	246	241
	Imputed	Median	2000.0000	433.2000	.2050
		Mean	2484.7593	502.9920	.2052
		N	109	105	103
CourtIVD	Actual	Median	1621.0000	298.5000	.1894
		Mean	1863.6901	329.3944	.1996
		N	626	672	609
	Imputed	Median	1214.0000	242.0000	.1796
		Mean	1448.5618	276.5483	.1883
		N	623	588	587
AdminIVD	Actual	Median	1563.0000	326.5000	.2072
		Mean	1777.2353	355.3529	.2105
		N	459	450	427
	Imputed	Median	1263.0000	242.0000	.1797
		Mean	1483.4214	297.6076	.1982
		N	477	446	443

**TABLE XI-A
Income Imputation and Deviations
by Category
For Noncustodial Fathers**

CATEGORY	Imputation		FWHDEV	FUPDEV	FDOWNDEV
DirPay	Actual	Median	.0000	134.5400	204.4700
		Mean	.4157	201.7258	272.2246
		N	522	79	138
	Imputed	Median	.0000	147.0300	183.2300
		Mean	.4503	399.2437	234.5275
		N	191	27	59
PSO	Actual	Median	.0000	50.0000	143.3500
		Mean	.3843	122.4905	243.4357
		N	255	21	77
	Imputed	Median	.0000	146.1750	190.0000
		Mean	.3694	144.6025	246.9478
		N	111	4	37
CourtIVD	Actual	Median	.0000	64.0000	109.0000
		Mean	.2817	85.3333	145.5135
		N	703	3	195
	Imputed	Median	.0000	91.0000	76.0000
		Mean	.3259	77.8000	105.5777
		N	626	5	199
AdminIVD	Actual	Median	.0000	75.0000	85.5000
		Mean	.1104	100.6667	108.9419
		N	498	3	52
	Imputed	Median	.0000	166.0000	85.0000
		Mean	.1705	158.5000	107.7145
		N	481	4	78

TABLE IX-B
Income Imputation
For Noncustodial Mothers

Imputation		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
Actual	Median	1208.6900	222.0000	.1526
	Mean	1598.2873	241.7777	.1524
	N	251	231	231
	Minimum	193.00	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1043.82	.40
	Std. Deviation	1385.1099	191.7199	8.823E-02
Imputed	Median	977.0000	171.0000	.1521
	Mean	1170.9508	194.4071	.1598
	N	381	348	348
	Minimum	1.00	25.00	.01
	Maximum	3670.00	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	438.3001	155.5729	9.553E-02
Total	Median	1060.0000	174.0000	.1521
	Mean	1340.6683	213.3062	.1568
	N	632	579	579
	Minimum	1.00	12.50	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	958.9562	172.3237	9.268E-02

**TABLE X-B
Income Imputation by Category
For Noncustodial Mothers**

CATEGORY	Imputation		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
DirPay	Actual	Median	2156.5000	229.0800	.1412
		Mean	2623.3360	286.9872	.1282
		N	58	64	58
	Imputed	Median	1211.0000	123.4200	.1411
		Mean	1298.6038	187.5977	.1466
		N	66	69	66
PSO	Actual	Median	1598.5000	229.9550	.1828
		Mean	1661.7555	226.4763	.1639
		N	22	24	20
	Imputed	Median	1129.3900	188.0000	.1532
		Mean	1225.4512	191.3276	.1547
		N	43	42	38
CourtIVD	Actual	Median	1415.0000	296.0000	.1896
		Mean	1495.3714	295.2794	.1890
		N	35	33	31
	Imputed	Median	969.5000	77.2500	7.608E-02
		Mean	1135.5000	126.9329	.1074
		N	32	28	28
AdminIVD	Actual	Median	1058.5000	100.5000	.1530
		Mean	1177.3529	148.6482	.1526
		N	136	176	122
	Imputed	Median	971.0000	171.0000	.1689
		Mean	1130.8083	195.0673	.1715
		N	240	231	216

**TABLE XI-B
Income Imputation and Deviations
by Category
For Noncustodial Mothers**

CATEGORY	Imputation		MWHDEV	MUPDEV	MDOWNDEV
DirPay	Actual	Median	1.0000	87.3650	282.7000
		Mean	.5312	223.9067	331.6593
		N	64	6	28
	Imputed	Median	1.0000	195.3550	184.0950
		Mean	.5507	195.3550	197.2803
		N	69	2	36
PSO	Actual	Median	.0000		209.3800
		Mean	.3846		257.4540
		N	26		10
	Imputed	Median	1.0000		127.7850
		Mean	.5106		159.9342
		N	47		24
CourtIVD	Actual	Median	.0000	249.0000	125.0000
		Mean	.3421	249.0000	165.2333
		N	38	1	12
	Imputed	Median	.0000		132.5000
		Mean	.1563		134.5060
		N	32		5
AdminIVD	Actual	Median	.0000	89.0000	92.5000
		Mean	.1261	89.0000	98.2143
		N	230	1	28
	Imputed	Median	.0000		101.0000
		Mean	.1882		118.4652
		N	255		48

**Figure One: Scatterplot
“Percent of Income ordered in Child Support” by “Net Income”
For Noncustodial Fathers**




TABLE XII
Child Support Exceeds 45 Percent of Income

GT45		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC	FWHDEV	FUPDEV	FDOWNDEV
Less than 45 percent	Median	1800.0000	338.1400	.1898	.0000	108.4100	110.5000
	Mean	2210.7480	418.2725	.1960	.3047	181.7914	167.4796
	N	2990	2990	2990	2990	131	780
Greater than 45 percent	Median	1441.3500	758.0000	.5305	.0000	538.5200	200.2250
	Mean	1680.7722	947.4663	.5876	.3171	817.5511	184.6125
	N	41	41	41	41	9	4
Total	Median	1795.0000	342.0000	.1921	.0000	113.7550	111.5000
	Mean	2203.5790	425.4308	.2012	.3048	222.6616	167.5670
	N	3031	3031	3031	3031	140	784

Appendices for Analysis of Child Support Orders

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**Table I-A Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
Including Zero Values
For Noncustodial Fathers**

CATEGORY		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
DirPay	Median	2845.7100	549.0000	.1945
	Mean	3445.2503	640.6368	.2048
	N	712	713	709
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	2983.4506	453.8264	.1069
PSO	Median	2472.2500	464.9400	.1872
	Mean	2719.6185	507.9950	.1939
	N	365	366	357
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	11500.00	1978.00	.53
	Std. Deviation	1522.4921	331.8300	9.777E-02
CourtIVD	Median	1363.0000	254.0000	.1800
	Mean	1556.9029	288.9116	.1858
	N	1329	1329	1249
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	6840.00	2000.00	.82
	Std. Deviation	885.9044	214.9868	9.780E-02
AdminIVD	Median	1363.0000	266.0000	.1851
	Mean	1556.0194	298.9191	.1898
	N	979	979	936
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	6105.00	1507.00	.99
	Std. Deviation	808.6407	214.8787	9.925E-02
Total	Median	1712.6800	311.2800	.1849
	Mean	2079.2159	389.5204	.1920
	N	3385	3387	3251
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	1799.9028	328.3046	.1005

**Table I-B Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
Including Zero Values
For Noncustodial Mothers**

CATEGORY		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
DirPay	Median	1481.6050	164.0000	.1411
	Mean	1801.9798	235.4242	.1380
	N	132	133	124
	Minimum	.00	17.00	.01
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	1821.4120	244.4965	.1122
PSO	Median	1217.0000	176.0000	.1494
	Mean	1222.6441	184.5368	.1409
	N	73	73	65
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	3405.81	630.20	.36
	Std. Deviation	701.0777	158.8331	9.407E-02
CourtIVD	Median	1074.5000	171.0000	.1288
	Mean	1266.7714	189.9763	.1323
	N	70	70	67
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	3707.00	799.00	.40
	Std. Deviation	654.8461	173.7383	9.932E-02
AdminIVD	Median	958.0000	142.0000	.1521
	Mean	889.7196	146.8508	.1481
	N	485	485	376
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	3670.00	812.00	.69
	Std. Deviation	614.2915	144.7999	9.483E-02
Total	Median	979.5000	143.0000	.1521
	Mean	1114.8715	169.9127	.1437
	N	760	761	632
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	1008.2556	173.2450	9.879E-02

Table II-A Deviation Reasons by Category for Noncustodial Fathers

			CATEGORY				Total
			DirPay	PSO	Court IVD	Admin IVD	
Fdevreason	Child Support From Other Relationships	Count	2	6	79	2	89
		% within Fdevreason	2.2%	6.7%	88.8%	2.2%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	.7%	4.3%	19.7%	1.5%	9.1%
	Possession of Wealth	Count	3	2			5
		% within Fdevreason	60.0%	40.0%			100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	1.0%	1.4%			.5%
	Tax Planning Considerations	Count	8	5			13
		% within Fdevreason	61.5%	38.5%			100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	2.6%	3.6%			1.3%
	Extraordinary Debt	Count	8	4	1		13
		% within Fdevreason	61.5%	30.8%	7.7%		100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	2.6%	2.9%	.2%		1.3%
	Disparity in the Living Costs	Count	2		1		3
		% within Fdevreason	66.7%		33.3%		100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	.7%		.2%		.3%
	Special Needs of Disabled Children	Count	1	1			2
		% within Fdevreason	50.0%	50.0%			100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	.3%	.7%			.2%
	Medical, Educational or Psychological	Count	2	1	5	1	9
		% within Fdevreason	22.2%	11.1%	55.6%	11.1%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	.7%	.7%	1.2%	.7%	.9%
	Residential Schedule Credit	Count	86	38	5	1	130
		% within Fdevreason	66.2%	29.2%	3.8%	.8%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	28.4%	27.3%	1.2%	.7%	13.3%
	Blended Family Approach	Count		2	43	8	53
		% within Fdevreason		3.8%	81.1%	15.1%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY		1.4%	10.7%	5.8%	5.4%
	Child Support Exceeds 45%	Count			2	5	7
		% within Fdevreason			28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY			.5%	3.6%	.7%
	Income is Less than AFDC Needs Standard	Count	6	12	93	67	178
		% within Fdevreason	3.4%	6.7%	52.2%	37.6%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	2.0%	8.6%	23.1%	48.9%	18.1%
	\$25 Presumption	Count			4	3	7
		% within Fdevreason			57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY			1.0%	2.2%	.7%
	Income Greater Than \$5000	Count	14	3			17
		% within Fdevreason	82.4%	17.6%			100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	4.6%	2.2%			1.7%
	No Reason Stated in Order	Count	27	2	2		31
		% within Fdevreason	87.1%	6.5%	6.5%		100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	8.9%	1.4%	.5%		3.2%
	Whole Family Approach	Count	9	11	108	44	172
		% within Fdevreason	5.2%	6.4%	62.8%	25.6%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	3.0%	7.9%	26.9%	32.1%	17.5%
	Mutual Agreement	Count	92	24			116
		% within Fdevreason	79.3%	20.7%			100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	30.4%	17.3%			11.8%
	ARVY Split Custody	Count	10	6			16
		% within Fdevreason	62.5%	37.5%			100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	3.3%	4.3%			1.6%
	Other	Count	33	22	59	6	120
		% within Fdevreason	27.5%	18.3%	49.2%	5.0%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	10.9%	15.8%	14.7%	4.4%	12.2%
Total		Count	303	139	402	137	981
		% within Fdevreason	30.9%	14.2%	41.0%	14.0%	100.0%
		% within CATEGORY	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table II-B Deviation Reasons by Category for Noncustodial Mothers

		CATEGORY				Total	
		DirPay	PSO	Court IVD	Admin IVD		
Mdev reason	Child Support From Other Relationships	Count	1	1			2
	% within Mdev reason	50.0%	50.0%				100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	1.4%	2.9%				1.0%
	Tax Planning Considerations	Count	1				1
	% within Mdev reason	100.0%					100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	1.4%					.5%
	Extraordinary Debt	Count				1	1
	% within Mdev reason					100.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY					1.3%	.5%
	Disparity in the Living Costs	Count	3				3
	% within Mdev reason	100.0%					100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	4.2%					1.5%
	Medical, Educational or Psychological	Count	2		2		4
	% within Mdev reason	50.0%			50.0%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	2.8%			11.1%		2.0%
	Residential Schedule Credit	Count	19	5	2	1	27
	% within Mdev reason	70.4%	18.5%	7.4%	3.7%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	26.4%	14.7%	11.1%	1.3%		13.4%
	Blended Family Approach	Count			2	3	5
	% within Mdev reason				40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY				11.1%	3.9%	2.5%
	Child Support Exceeds 45%	Count		1	1	1	3
	% within Mdev reason			33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY			2.9%	5.6%	1.3%	1.5%
	Income is Less than AFDC Needs Standard	Count	20	15	6	50	91
	% within Mdev reason	22.0%	16.5%	6.6%	54.9%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	27.8%	44.1%	33.3%	64.9%		45.3%
\$25 Presumption	Count	1			2	3	
% within Mdev reason	33.3%				66.7%	100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	1.4%				2.6%	1.5%	
Income Greater Than \$5000	Count	1				1	
% within Mdev reason	100.0%					100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	1.4%					.5%	
No Reason Stated in Order	Count	3			1	4	
% within Mdev reason	75.0%				25.0%	100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	4.2%				1.3%	2.0%	
Whole Family Approach	Count	2	2		12	16	
% within Mdev reason	12.5%	12.5%			75.0%	100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	2.8%	5.9%			15.6%	8.0%	
Mutual Agreement	Count	4	3			7	
% within Mdev reason	57.1%	42.9%				100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	5.6%	8.8%				3.5%	
ARVY Split Custody	Count	5				5	
% within Mdev reason	100.0%					100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	6.9%					2.5%	
Other	Count	10	7	5	6	28	
% within Mdev reason	35.7%	25.0%	17.9%	21.4%		100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	13.9%	20.6%	27.8%	7.8%		13.9%	
Total	Count	72	34	18	77	201	
% within Mdev reason	35.8%	16.9%	9.0%	38.3%		100.0%	
% within CATEGORY	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	

Table III Distribution of Order Types

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Divorce/Dissolution	1204	27.8	27.8	27.8
	Temporary Court Order	85	2.0	2.0	29.8
	Paternity Order	306	7.1	7.1	36.8
	Other Court Order	144	3.3	3.3	40.2
	Administrative Order	152	3.5	3.5	43.7
	Consent Order	79	1.8	1.8	45.5
	Agreed Settlement	217	5.0	5.0	50.5
	Admin. Notice Default	927	21.4	21.4	71.9
	Mod-Court Order Only	643	14.9	14.9	86.8
	Judgement/Paternity	476	11.0	11.0	97.8
	09-710 Default	67	1.5	1.5	99.3
	Misc.	29	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	4329	100.0	100.0	

Table IV Order Types by Category

		CATEGORY				Total
		DirPay	PSO	Court IVD	Admin IVD	
Divorce/Dissolution	Count	789	279	136		1204
	% within ORDTYPE	65.5%	23.2%	11.3%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	77.8%	62.7%	9.7%		27.8%
Temporary Court Order	Count			85		85
	% within ORDTYPE			100.0%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY			6.1%		2.0%
Paternity Order	Count	19	30	257		306
	% within ORDTYPE	6.2%	9.8%	84.0%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	1.9%	6.7%	18.3%		7.1%
Other Court Order	Count	57	29	58		144
	% within ORDTYPE	39.6%	20.1%	40.3%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	5.6%	6.5%	4.1%		3.3%
Administrative Order	Count				152	152
	% within ORDTYPE				100.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY				10.3%	3.5%
Consent Order	Count				79	79
	% within ORDTYPE				100.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY				5.4%	1.8%
Agreed Settlement	Count				217	217
	% within ORDTYPE				100.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY				14.8%	5.0%
Admin. Notice Default	Count				927	927
	% within ORDTYPE				100.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY				63.1%	21.4%
Mod-Court Order Only	Count	148	102	393		643
	% within ORDTYPE	23.0%	15.9%	61.1%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	14.6%	22.9%	28.1%		14.9%
Judgement/Paternity	Count	1	5	470		476
	% within ORDTYPE	.2%	1.1%	98.7%		100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	.1%	1.1%	33.5%		11.0%
09-710 Default	Count				67	67
	% within ORDTYPE				100.0%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY				4.6%	1.5%
Misc.	Count			2	27	29
	% within ORDTYPE			6.9%	93.1%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY			.1%	1.8%	.7%
Total	Count	1014	445	1401	1469	4329
	% within ORDTYPE	23.4%	10.3%	32.4%	33.9%	100.0%
	% within CATEGORY	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table V-A Deviation Rates and Amounts by Type of Order for Noncustodial Fathers

ORDTYPE		FWHDEV	FUPDEV	FDOWNDEV
Divorce/Dissolution	Median	.0000	121.2550	190.2350
	Mean	.3739	243.9474	257.4174
	N	936	110	240
Temporary Court Order	Median	.0000		89.0000
	Mean	.1154		246.4111
	N	78		9
Paternity Order	Median	.0000	36.0000	93.0000
	Mean	.3147	36.0000	118.6045
	N	286	2	88
Other Court Order	Median	.0000	28.8000	155.9700
	Mean	.2593	135.6050	186.1370
	N	108	8	20
Administrative Order	Median	.0000		235.0000
	Mean	2.857E-02		218.6667
	N	105		3
Consent Order	Median	.0000	170.0000	134.0000
	Mean	.1132	170.0000	165.7780
	N	53	1	5
Agreed Settlement	Median	.0000		109.9800
	Mean	.1655		122.7254
	N	145		24
Admin. Notice Default	Median	.0000	162.0000	85.0000
	Mean	.1473	148.2000	98.1841
	N	584	5	81
Mod-Court Order Only	Median	.0000	98.3200	129.0000
	Mean	.3819	139.1518	187.3784
	N	529	17	185
Judgement/Paternity	Median	.0000	77.5000	75.5000
	Mean	.3497	77.5000	96.0247
	N	469	2	162
09-710 Default	Median	.0000	25.0000	67.5000
	Mean	.1692	25.0000	110.0500
	N	65	1	10
Misc	Median	.0000		77.5000
	Mean	.2759		109.3750
	N	29		8
Total	Median	.0000	109.7050	113.0000
	Mean	.2896	215.3947	170.9431
	N	3387	146	835

Table V-B Deviation Rates and Amounts by Type of Order for Noncustodial Mothers

ORDTYPE		MWHDEV	MUPDEV	MDOWNDEV
Divorce/Dissolution	Median	1.0000	249.0000	207.1450
	Mean	.5338	283.5420	261.3188
	N	133	5	66
Temporary Court Order	Median	.0000		
	Mean	.0000		
	N	7		
Paternity Order	Median	.0000		89.4500
	Mean	.3889		134.6186
	N	18		7
Other Court Order	Median	.0000	365.7100	166.5400
	Mean	.2609	365.7100	133.0040
	N	23	1	5
Administrative Order	Median	.0000		145.0000
	Mean	8.696E-02		138.7500
	N	46		4
Consent Order	Median	.0000		124.0000
	Mean	.1538		127.2500
	N	26		4
Agreed Settlement	Median	.0000		77.5000
	Mean	.1714		95.9167
	N	70		12
Admin. Notice Default	Median	.0000	89.0000	92.5000
	Mean	.1672	89.0000	111.0952
	N	341	1	56
Mod-Court Order Only	Median	.0000	75.0000	129.9050
	Mean	.4333	66.5767	173.8236
	N	90	3	36
Judgement/Paternity	Median	.0000		344.8000
	Mean	.2000		344.8000
	N	5		1
Total	Median	.0000	94.3650	133.6500
	Mean	.2648	207.2150	177.4512
	N	759	10	191

Table VI County Assignment to Region

County	Region
Adams	East.
Asotin	East.
Benton	East.
Chelan	East.
Clallam	Non-urban West.
Clark	Urban West.
Columbia	East.
Cowlitz	Non-urban West.
Douglas	East.
Ferry	East.
Franklin	East.
Garfield	East.
Grant	East.
Harbor	Non-urban West.
Island	Non-urban West.
Jefferson	Non-urban West.
King	Urban West.
Kitsap	Non-urban West.
Kittitas	East.
Klickitat	East.
Lewis	Non-urban West.
Lincoln	East.
Mason	Non-urban West.
Okanogan	East.
Pacific	Non-urban West.
Oreille	East.
Pierce	Urban West.
San Juan	Non-urban West.
Skagit	Non-urban West.
Skamania	Non-urban West.
Snohomish	Urban West.
Spokane	East.
Stevens	East.
Thurston	Non-urban West.
Wahkiakum	Non-urban West.
Walla	East.
Whatcom	Non-urban West.
Whiman	East.
Yakima	East.

**Table VII-A Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
Including Zero Values
by Region
for Noncustodial Fathers**

REGION		Fnet	Ftrxpymnt	FPCTINC
Urban West	Median	2017.1750	367.0000	.1905
	Mean	2455.0725	453.8341	.1972
	N	1518	1518	1459
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	2345.6392	380.7983	.1060
Non-urban West	Median	1652.0000	300.0000	.1849
	Mean	1850.1682	347.6332	.1870
	N	784	786	752
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	11432.00	2500.00	.74
	Std. Deviation	1104.2159	264.6837	9.038E-02
East	Median	1400.0000	258.5000	.1792
	Mean	1704.3665	324.9508	.1871
	N	1036	1036	996
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	10653.00	2000.00	.79
	Std. Deviation	1085.5101	267.6191	9.874E-02
Total	Median	1704.6200	310.0000	.1843
	Mean	2080.0047	388.8649	.1917
	N	3338	3340	3207
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	31050.44	5000.00	1.07
	Std. Deviation	1809.1429	328.8439	.1004

**Table VII-B Income, Order Amount, Order as a Percent of Income
Including Zero Values
by Region
for Noncustodial Mothers**

REGION		Mnet	Mtrxpymnt	MPCTINC
Urban West	Median	1070.0000	143.0000	.1521
	Mean	1258.7611	196.4492	.1517
	N	332	333	275
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	1294.4672	202.7109	.1101
Non-urban West	Median	969.0000	109.2500	.1501
	Mean	981.1576	142.3734	.1323
	N	146	146	115
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	4305.83	693.03	.40
	Std. Deviation	747.3372	143.4922	9.200E-02
East	Median	970.0000	142.0000	.1512
	Mean	1023.2501	152.4850	.1375
	N	267	267	230
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	4466.66	761.25	.44
	Std. Deviation	665.4324	143.0403	8.615E-02
Total	Median	982.0000	143.0000	.1521
	Mean	1119.9537	170.1308	.1428
	N	745	746	620
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	18314.66	1100.00	.73
	Std. Deviation	1014.0903	173.7729	9.868E-02

Review of the Washington State Child Support Schedule September 2002

Is the Schedule Being Followed?

To determine whether the Schedule is being correctly implemented requires that we analyze the process according to the various steps involved in establishing the presumptive transfer amount.¹

Step One: Total Basic Obligation

The first step – and the findings in this report will suggest, the most important step – to ensure that the Schedule is followed correctly is accurately establishing the total basic obligation based on the combined monthly net income of the mother and father, and the number and age of children involved in the order. This step corresponds to Line 5 on the Worksheet.

The data were analyzed to determine whether, given the combined income and children in the order, the basic obligation *in the order* corresponds accurately to the obligation prescribed *in the Schedule* for that income level, and age and number of children.²

Table One below shows that the Schedule is correctly followed in establishing the basic obligation in most orders. Specifically, for those involving one child, over 98 percent correctly adhere to the Schedule.³

Table One
Step One: Basic Obligation

N. of Kids	Percent Step One OK	N Step One OK
1	98.1 %	(N=2367)
2	95.3 %	(N=733)
3	91.4 %	(N=203)

¹ The actual transfer amount, of course, may differ from the presumptive amount established by the Schedule if a deviation is involved in the order. Thus, by definition, deviations represent a break from the Schedule and are not analyzed here. Also, given data limitations, not each step in the process can be analyzed. These limitations will be discussed later in this report.

² Two notes: a) For those readers interested in the programming of this analysis, it is provided in Appendix A; and b) Given the Schedule is advisory (and not presumptive) for combined incomes in excess of \$5000, orders with such incomes are not analyzed here. They are analyzed above in 1. Analysis of Child Support Orders, pp. 15-16.

³ 67 percent of all orders involve one child; 25 percent entail two children; 6.7 percent involve three children; thus, 98.7 percent of all orders are for three or less children.

As the number of children increases, the table shows that compliance drops slightly: for two children, 95.3 percent follow correctly and for three children, the percentage falls to 91.4.⁴

As Table Two indicates, the likelihood of correctly establishing the basic obligation differs substantially depending on whether the order is IVD or non-IVD. All orders processed within the IVD offices correctly establish the basic obligation, based on the income and children in the order. In the non-IVD cases, the table shows that 90.1 percent of the one-child orders are handled accurately; 86.9 percent of the two-child orders, and 73.6 percent of the three-child orders.

Table Two
Step One: Basic Obligation By Category

N. of Kids	Non-IVD Percent Step One OK	IVD Percent Step One OK
1	90.1 % (N=409)	100.0 % (N=1958)
2	86.9 % (N=238)	100.0 % (N=495)
3	73.6 % (N=53)	100.0 % (N=150)

What causes the basic obligation in the order to differ from the amount in the Schedule?

While it is impossible to know with certainty what causes the obligation in the order to differ from that prescribed by the Schedule, a review of those cases which do not follow the Schedule reveals some potentially important clues.

As indicated above, less than two percent of the orders involving one child do not follow the Schedule. These orders were examined on a case-by-case basis to see if a potential cause of error might be detected. The most common mistake is due to rounding errors. For example, for a combined monthly income of \$3265, the basic obligation in the order is based on an income of \$3200, rather than the \$3300 prescribed by the Schedule. These rounding errors account for almost half of the errors in establishing the basic obligation.

The next most common mistake is misalignment of income and obligation. For example, for an income figure of \$3400 with one-child under 12 years old, the basic obligation appears in the order as \$609; however, this obligation aligns in the Schedule with an income of \$4000, not \$3400. (The correct obligation in the Schedule for \$3400 would have been \$574.) Of these types of errors, most of them use higher income figures in setting the obligation than the actual income figures in the order. These two types of errors account for almost 80 percent of the errors. The remaining errors are distributed among using the wrong number of children, the wrong age category for the children, or there is no discernible pattern.

⁴ Given only 55 cases have more than three children, they are not analyzed here.

Step Two: Each Parent's Basic Child Support Obligation

Once the total basic obligation is determined, it is apportioned to each parent according to their income share. The data may be analyzed to determine whether or not the total obligation was allocated correctly to each parent. This corresponds to Line 7 on the Worksheet.

As shown below in Table Three, most orders correctly apportion the basic obligation between the two parents, based on their income shares.⁵ The father's share for orders with one child is allocated correctly in 94.3 percent of the cases. For those with two and three children, 94.2 and 96.6 percent, respectively, are calculated correctly.⁶

Table Three also shows that the mother's share is typically allocated correctly. For those orders with one child, 94.6 percent are calculated accurately. For those with two children, 93.8 percent are correct, and for those with three children, 98.3 percent are correct.⁷

Table Three
Step Two: Parent's Share Correct

N. of Kids	Father's Percent Correct	Mother's Percent Correct
1	94.3 % (N=428)	94.6 % (N=422)
2	94.2 % (N=258)	93.8 % (N=258)
3	96.6% (N=56)	98.3 % (N=57)

The data above indicate the percent with the correct computation based on the obligation *in the order*, which may or may not have been the correct obligation *from the Schedule*. A more complete picture of Step Two is gained by examining the cumulative impact of Steps One and Two. That is, when we combine the likelihood of establishing the obligation correctly in Step One with the probability of calculating the parent's share accurately in Step Two, what is the likelihood that the Schedule is being followed?

The answer to this question is presented in Table Four on the next page. For orders involving one child and a noncustodial father, the likelihood of following at both steps is 89.3 percent.

This figure, which may be interpreted as the compliance rate at Steps One and Two, is shown on the next page in Table Five for orders with one, two, and three children, as well as for both noncustodial fathers and mothers. The table shows a small variation in the likelihood of following for orders with different number of children, but no discernible pattern in the variation. Additionally, very small differences are displayed between the orders for noncustodial fathers and

⁵Data on Line 7 were in the database for the non-IVD cases only and thus the Step Two analysis is based solely on those orders. Given it is only a computational step, however, later in this report, it is calculated for the IVD orders also.

⁶ The cell sizes become very small for at this juncture in the analysis and are not examined for cases involving more than three children.

⁷ As above, the cell sizes become very small and are not analyzed further.

mothers. Table Five indicates a compliance rate of between 85 and 90 percent at Steps One and Two of the child support award process.⁸

Table Four
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Two
FATHERS WITH ONE CHILD

			Step Two OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	17	26	43
		% within Step One OK	39.5%	60.5%	100.0%
		% of Total	3.8%	5.8%	9.6%
	Yes	Count	5	402	407
		% within Step One OK	1.2%	98.8%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.1%	89.3%	90.4%
Total	Count	22	428	450	
	% within Step One OK	4.9%	95.1%	100.0%	
	% of Total	4.9%	95.1%	100.0%	

Table Five
Compliance Rate at Steps One and Two

N. of Kids	Father's Compliance Rate	Mother's Compliance Rate
1	89.3 % (N=402)	88.9 % (N=394)
2	85.3 % (N=233)	84.7 % (N=232)
3	87.9 % (N=51)	87.9 % (N=51)

Not surprisingly, the overall likelihood of following at Step One and Two is lower than the rate of following at Step Two independently of Step One. This arises from the fact that a mistake made in Step One may carry over to Step Two and compound any systematic likelihood of making an error in Step Two, the issue to which we now turn.

At Step One, we saw that the most likely form of error arose from income-rounding mistakes. The cumulative analysis above allows us to estimate the most likely cause of error in Step Two. Recall that the rate of compliance with the Schedule at Step Two (independent of Step One) is high: approximately 94 percent for all orders. A high rate of compliance would be expected, given this

⁸ The first entry in Table Five is based on the percent shown in Table Four where both steps are followed correctly. The background data for the other five entries in Table Five may be found in Appendices B-1 through B-5.

step in the process is a simple computation. In fact, we may be surprised to find that we do not observe almost 100% compliance.

The explanation lies in the fact that a mistake made in Step One can carry over to Step Two. As Table Four indicates, if Step One is correct, then Step Two is correctly apportioned in 98.8 percent of the cases. Put another way, the best estimate of computational error is 1.2 percent. In summary, Step Two is a basic computation and the error rate associated with that calculation is 1.2 percent.

For all orders, computational error rates of approximately 2 percent are observed, as shown in Table Six below⁹

Table Six
Computational Error Rates at Step Two

N. of Kids	Father's Error Rate	Mother's Error Rate
1	1.2 % (N=5)	1.7 % (N=7)
2	2.1 % (N=5)	2.5 % (N=6)
3	1.9% (N=1)	1.9 % (N=1)

The data above indicate the importance of Step One. While most orders follow the Schedule correctly, most errors that are made – in Step Two – appear to arise from miscalculating the basic obligation in Step One.

Step Three: The Presumptive Transfer Amount

The last step analyzed here in determining child support (prior to any deviation) is the presumptive transfer amount, which corresponds to Line 15e of the Worksheet. At this juncture, the analysis is complicated by the fact that after Line 7, individual factors arise in determining the child support order. Specifically, lines 8 through 14 of the Worksheet provide for 1) health care expenses, 2) day care and other special child rearing expenses, 3) child support credits. The first two factors may add to the noncustodial parent's obligation. In this case, the presumptive transfer amount (Line 15e) would be greater than the parent's share of the obligation (Line 7). The third factor (child support credits) would decrease the parent's share of the obligation, with the result that the presumptive transfer amount would be less than the obligation share.

Thus, after Line 7, no standard exists to compare actual orders against, in order to determine whether or not they are adhering to the Schedule. Therefore, we can analyze the difference in the parent's share (Line 7) and the presumptive transfer amount (Line 15e). The difference will reflect:

⁹ Again, the first entry in Table Six is found in Table Four by observing the percent with Step One correct and Step Two incorrect. The background data for the other five entries in Table Six may be found in Appendices B-1 through B-5.

- 1) any additions and/or subtractions associated with Lines 8-14, which would not constitute errors;
- 2) any errors in the process at Step Three.¹⁰

Table Seven provides data on the percent of orders that display a difference between Line 7 and 15e.¹¹ Because they reflect both (1) and (2) above, the data cannot be interpreted as a measure of the error rate at Step Three. Some of the difference undoubtedly arises from error, but given the small percentage of errors observed thus far in the process, it is likely that much of the difference reflects Lines 8-14.

According to the table, for noncustodial fathers with one child, 13.3 percent of the orders show a difference between Line 7 and 15e. For mothers, the comparable figure is 8.5 percent. If we employed the assumption that all orders have zero dollar amounts for Lines 8-14, the estimated error rate would be 13.3 percent for fathers (with one child in the order) and 8.5 percent for noncustodial mothers. Given the implausibility of this assumption coupled with the low probability of error in Steps One and Two, we can reasonably assume the error rate is much less than that. The 13.3 percent error rate is thus a good estimate of the maximum error rate.

Table Seven
Percent with Difference between Line 7 and Line 15e

N. of Kids	Noncustodial Fathers % w/Difference	Noncustodial Mothers % w/Difference
1	13.3 % (N=251)	8.5 % (N=31)
2	20.9 % (N=117)	10.9 % (N=15)
3	18.6 % (N=118)	8.5 % (N=4)

Direction and Magnitude of Differences Between Line 7 and Line 15e

Finally, for those orders with a difference between Line 7 and 15e, the data were further analyzed to determine the direction and magnitude of these differences.¹²

For orders with noncustodial father and one child: Tables Eight and Nine¹³

¹⁰ We are somewhat restricted in our analysis of Step Three because the database does not include information on Lines 8 through Line 14. With that information, we could separate the additions and subtractions associated with those steps in the Worksheet from “errors.” Ideally, the next review of the Schedule will have data on Lines 8 - 14 in order to provide more information regarding this part of the award-setting process.

¹¹ Line 7 was calculated for the IV-D orders, given it was not included in the database. This requires no estimation: as required at Line 7, we simply apportioned the basic obligation to the parents based on their income shares.

¹² Given the small cell sizes for those not following the Schedule at Step One and Two, this analysis is not presented for these cases. Additionally, the differences that appeared for these cases appeared to be random.

¹³ Given the small number of noncustodial mothers not adhering to the Schedule (n = 31), the direction and magnitude of their differences are not discussed here, but are available upon request.

As shown in Table Eight, among those orders with a difference, 62.9 percent increase the obligation^{14, 15} That is, the presumptive amount in the order is greater than the amount required by the Schedule in almost 63 percent of the orders. The median increase is \$125 (with a mean of \$142), indicating that on average the actual presumptive transfer amount is \$142 greater than that required by the Schedule.

Table Eight
Presumptive Transfer Exceeds
Parent's Share
Noncustodial Fathers and One Child

FUP715		
N	Valid	158
	Missing	93
Mean		142.0755
Median		125.3761
Mode		125.38 ^a
Std. Deviation		107.0896
Variance		11468.18
Range		512.80
Minimum		7.49
Maximum		520.29
Percentiles	10	20.5537
	20	36.9834
	25	52.8975
	30	68.1340
	40	93.1718
	50	125.3761
	60	151.9381
	70	191.6173
	75	217.8325
	80	235.9066
90	292.8065	

Table Nine
Presumptive Transfer Less Than
Parent's Share
Noncustodial Fathers and One Child

FDOWN715		
N	Valid	93
	Missing	158
Mean		58.5332
Median		39.8810
Mode		15.00
Std. Deviation		52.7872
Variance		2786.4896
Range		240.32
Minimum		5.99
Maximum		246.32
Percentiles	10	12.8246
	20	19.9191
	25	24.6922
	30	27.5057
	40	33.6693
	50	39.8810
	60	50.3189
	70	66.5943
	75	74.0123
	80	85.3097
90	127.9604	

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

¹³ Given the small number of noncustodial mothers not adhering to the Schedule (n = 31), the direction and magnitude of their differences are not discussed here, but are available upon request.

¹⁴ 62.9 percent does not appear in Table Eight: it is calculated by taking the number found there (n=158) and dividing it by the total number (n=251) that have a difference between Line 7 and 15e.

¹⁵ In determining the magnitude of the errors, some decision is necessary as to what constitutes an "error." An examination of the data suggested that "errors" of less than \$5.00 were largely the result of computational differences in the parent's share of obligation based on his or her share of combined income. The SPSS program, for example, would compute a share at .6522 while the order was based on .65. To account for this, only differences of greater than \$5.00 were counted as "errors."

Table Nine provides the data for those orders where the presumptive transfer is less than the parent’s share of the obligation. For the remaining 37 percent of these orders (those which show a decline between Line 7 and 15e), the median decrease is \$40 (with a mean of \$59).

As suggested in the discussion above, some portion of these differences may indicate an error *per se*, but we would expect that medical and child care expenses and child support credits explain a significant portion of them.

For orders with noncustodial father and two children: Tables Ten and Eleven

As shown in Table Ten, for these orders with a difference between Line 7 and 15e, a significant number (45.3 percent) increase the obligation. The median increase is \$90 (with a mean of \$152). Thus, on average, the actual presumptive amount exceeds the amount required in the Schedule by \$152.

Table Ten
Presumptive Transfer Exceeds
Parent’s Share
Noncustodial Fathers and Two Children

FUP715		
N	Valid	53
	Missing	64
Mean		151.7590
Median		89.9806
Mode		57.36
Std. Deviation		176.1888
Variance		31042.51
Range		846.24
Minimum		5.88
Maximum		852.12
Percentiles	10	16.2607
	20	25.2445
	25	35.1046
	30	42.3145
	40	65.2557
	50	89.9806
	60	105.2358
	70	159.9738
	75	204.6191
	80	248.4599
	90	421.6384

Table Eleven
Presumptive Transfer Less Than
Parent’s Share
Noncustodial Fathers and Two Children

FDOWN715		
N	Valid	64
	Missing	53
Mean		82.5240
Median		63.0101
Mode		41.00 ^a
Std. Deviation		86.4647
Variance		7476.1497
Range		501.02
Minimum		6.12
Maximum		507.14
Percentiles	10	10.9763
	20	21.4581
	25	23.5749
	30	38.0629
	40	46.6638
	50	63.0101
	60	72.0391
	70	85.3308
	75	95.7831
	80	123.1320
	90	201.7713

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is show

As shown in Table Eleven, for the remaining 54.7 percent of the orders with a difference, the median decrease from the parent’s share of the basic obligation is \$63 (with a mean of \$83). That is, on average, the actual presumptive amount is \$83 less than that dictated by the Schedule.

In Step One, we observed that orders most likely to follow the Schedule correctly are found in the IVD category. Similar analysis is performed here: Table Twelve shows that for orders involving noncustodial fathers and one-child, only 7.8 percent of the IV-D orders display a difference between Line 7 and 15e, compared to 41.4 percent of the non-IVD orders. The table also shows these data for noncustodial mothers and orders involving two or three children. For all orders, the IVD orders are much less likely to display any difference between Lines 7 and 15e. While some of this difference is likely explained by a higher probability of medical and child care expenses and child care credits among non-IVD orders, it is also probable that the greater likelihood of errors made in non-IVD orders at Step One have resulted in a higher overall error rate for non-IVD orders.

Table Twelve
Presumptive Transfer Equal to Parent’s Share
(Line 7 = Line 15e)

N. of Kids	Fathers		Mothers	
	Non-IVD % Step 3 OK	IVD % Step 3 OK	Non-IVD % Step 3 OK	IVD % Step 3 OK
1	41.4% (N=128)	7.8% (N=123)	20.7% (N=17)	4.9% (N=14)
2	44.8% (N=87)	8.2% (N=30)	27.5% (N=11)	4.1% (N=4)
3	47.2% (N=17)	9.2% (N=10)	23.1% (N=3)	2.9% (N=1)

Finally, as we did at Step Two, our understanding of the child support process may be increased if we consider the process cumulatively. Given the low computational error rate of approximately 2 percent at Step Two, we will look at the cumulative process between Steps One and Three.¹⁶

Table Thirteen shows that – for orders with one child and a noncustodial father – 86.6 percent correctly follow the Schedule at Step One and display no difference between Line 7 and 15e. Thus, if no orders include additional expenses and/or credits on Lines 8-14, the percent of orders correctly following the Schedule throughout the child support process is 86.6 percent. Another interpretation of this statistic is that it provides the lower bound estimate of compliance. As suggested above, we can be confident that the compliance rate is significantly higher than that.

¹⁶ Two other reasons suggest Steps One and Three, rather than Steps Two and Three: 1) an order with no difference at Step Three, by definition, would have been following the Schedule at Step Two, and 2) the data for Step Two were only available for non-IVD and thus to analyze Steps Two and Three would have eliminated the IVD orders.

**Table Thirteen
Lower Bound Estimate of Overall Compliance**

N. of Kids	Father's Compliance Rate	Mother's Compliance Rate
1	86.6 % (N=1629)	89.6 % (N=327)
2	77.4 % (N=432)	86.0 % (N=117)
3	80.7 % (N=117)	89.4 % (N=42)

Table Thirteen also shows that this lower bound estimate is higher for one-child orders with noncustodial mothers: 89.6 percent. We also observe a lower rate for orders with more than one child.¹⁷

While 86.6 percent is the lower bound estimate of the overall compliance rate, we can also derive a lower bound estimate of the overall error rate by identifying those orders that both make an error in establishing the basic obligation at Step One and those with a difference between Lines 7 and 15e. Table Thirteen shows that lower bound estimate for the overall rate ranges from one to three percent for the orders for noncustodial fathers and mothers.¹⁸

In summary, based on the percentage of errors at Step One and Step Two, and the likelihood that some orders include adjustments in Lines 8-14, the best estimate of the overall error rate in setting child support orders is a range of 1 - 3 percent, shown in the table below.¹⁹

**Table Fourteen
Lower Bound Estimate of Overall Error**

N. of Kids	Father's Compliance Rate	Mother's Compliance Rate
1	1.0 % (N=18)	1.1 % (N=4)
2	3.0 % (N=17)	0.7 % (N=1)
3	2.8 % (N=4)	0.0 % (N=0)

Based on the data analysis, how could compliance to the Schedule be improved?

While the estimated overall error rate is fairly low, this analysis has indicated that the key step in overall adherence to the Schedule is correctly establishing the basic obligation at Step One. The data show that only 14.3 percent of orders with an error in Step One correctly establish the presumptive amount (as measured by no difference at Step Three).²⁰

¹⁷ The background tables upon which this summary table is based may be found in Appendices C-1 through C-6.

¹⁸ The reader will observe that the cell sizes are very small for noncustodial mothers at this point in the analysis.

¹⁹ The background tables used to compile this summary table may be found in Appendices C-1 through C-6.

²⁰ This statistic is found in Appendix C.

As reported in the first section, most of the errors that occur at Step One occur because of rounding errors. The prominence of such errors would likely be reduced by simply changing the income levels in the Schedule to income ranges. For example, \$2100 would be replaced by \$2050-\$2149. Then the Instructions (pg. 6) would be revised to read “In the left-hand column, locate the income range that includes the income entered on line 4 of the Worksheet.” Thus, rounding would be avoided. Such a change would involve no change in the basic obligation associated with various income levels.

A more significant change would involve reducing the number of income categories, by bracketing them over a \$500 range. For example, for incomes between \$2550 and \$3050, the basic obligation would be \$550.²¹ Such a change would decrease the myriad number of cells in the Schedule, increasing its simplicity and likelihood of being followed. This comes at the cost, however, of averaging the obligation across a range of income levels. In the above example, compared to the current Schedule, the obligation would increase by \$13 for those at the low end of the range and decrease by \$13 for those at the high end. Whether such a change is deemed desirable depends on the perceived benefits of the change, one of which will be discussed next.

In addition to the reduced complexity of the Schedule discussed above, a significant additional benefit would be the opportunity to rationalize the obligations across income levels. Currently, at low income levels the obligation increases most dramatically as income rises; the obligation increases much less as income rises at the highest income levels; finally, the obligation rises least of all at mid-income levels. For example, between incomes of \$1600 and \$2000 the obligation increases by \$80; between incomes of \$4600 and \$5000, the obligation increases by \$49; and between \$3100 and \$3500, the obligation increases by only \$9.00. More significantly, these impose a regressive child support structure: where the increase in the obligation as income increases is borne most heavily by those at lower income levels. In the above example, the \$80 increase in the obligation as income rises by \$500 at low income levels represents a 16 percent increase; the \$49 increase in the obligation at high income levels is only 9.8 percent; and the \$9 increase at mid-income levels is only a 1.8 percent increase.²²

While few (if any) individuals would actually calculate the percentages above, many could observe that throughout the Schedule in the middle-income ranges the obligation increases by only \$1.00 with each income level, while it increases by \$20 at low-income levels and by \$11 at high income levels. The perceived lack of logic in the Schedule may thus reduce the likelihood of adherence to it.

²¹ This example is based on the case of one-child, less than twelve years old and is followed in the paragraph that follows. Similar conclusions may be drawn from cases with older and/or more children.

²² These percentages represent *the change in the obligation divided by \$500* at various income levels; regressivity is also seen by examining the percentages associated with the *obligation divided by income* at various income levels. For example, using the case of one-child, less than twelve years old, the obligation as a percent of income falls from over 20 percent at low income levels to less than 15 percent at high income levels.

This case for simplifying the Schedule is substantiated by examining which orders are most likely to adhere to the Schedule. Although most do establish the basic obligation correctly, all of those that do not follow the Schedule accurately are found in the non-IVD categories. This is true for all orders, regardless of the number of children in the order. It seems likely that the individuals establishing IVD orders are more likely to understand the logic of the Schedule and/or have greater incentive to ensure that it is accurately followed. Those outside the IVD system would have less understanding of the Schedule and likely be less motivated to follow it correctly.

One last note, as mentioned in an earlier footnote, future reviews of adherence to the Schedule would be enhanced by the addition of Lines 8 to 14 of the Worksheet to the database. This would allow Step Three to separate errors *per se* from the additions to and subtractions from the parent's share of the basic obligation in determining the presumptive transfer amount.

Appendix A

Programming to Determine if Step One Ok with Two Children

*
* This program works from the Child Support Schedule to determine if Step One is computed
* correctly when the number of kids for the noncustodial parent is two. The variable
* BSOCH3OK indicates whether the schedule is being followed properly for the first child,
* and BSOCH2OK indicates whether the schedule is being followed properly for
* the second child. If both are determined correctly, then step one is set as ok, that is
* the variable BSOCHOK is set to 1.
*

*
* Initialize bsochok to zero by default, and to 9 if key variables are missing. Set bsoch1ok
* and bsoch2ok to zero by default.
*

```
compute bsochok = 0.  
if (SYSMIS(bsoch1) OR SYSMIS(bsoch2) OR SYSMIS(NET)) bsochok = 9.  
compute bsoch1ok = 0.  
compute bsoch2ok = 0.
```

*
* See if bsoch1ok should be turned on (ok = 1) for the first child, if their age is less
* than or equal to 11.
*

```
if ( net lt 650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 103) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 650 and net lt 750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 120) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 750 and net lt 850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 137) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 850 and net lt 950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 154) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 950 and net lt 1050 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 171) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1050 and net lt 1150 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 188) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1150 and net lt 1250 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 205) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1250 and net lt 1350 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 221) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1350 and net lt 1450 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 238) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1450 and net lt 1550 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 254) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1550 and net lt 1650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 269) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1650 and net lt 1750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 285) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1750 and net lt 1850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 300) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1850 and net lt 1950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 316) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 1950 and net lt 2050 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 331) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2050 and net lt 2150 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 347) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2150 and net lt 2250 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 362) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2250 and net lt 2350 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 378) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2350 and net lt 2450 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 393) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2450 and net lt 2550 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 408) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2550 and net lt 2650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 416) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2650 and net lt 2750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 421) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2750 and net lt 2850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 427) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2850 and net lt 2950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 431) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 2950 and net lt 3050 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 436) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 3050 and net lt 3150 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 439) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 3150 and net lt 3250 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 442) bsoch1ok=1.  
if (net ge 3250 and net lt 3350 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 445) bsoch1ok=1.
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if (net ge 3350 and net lt 3450 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 446) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3450 and net lt 3550 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 447) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3550 and net lt 3650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 448) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3650 and net lt 3750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 449) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3750 and net lt 3850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 452) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3850 and net lt 3950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 463) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3950 and net lt 4050 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 473) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4050 and net lt 4150 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 484) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4150 and net lt 4250 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 495) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4250 and net lt 4350 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 506) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4350 and net lt 4450 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 516) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4450 and net lt 4550 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 525) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4550 and net lt 4650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 535) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4650 and net lt 4750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 545) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4750 and net lt 4850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 554) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4850 and net lt 4950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 564) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4950 and net lt 5050 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 574) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5050 and net lt 5150 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 584) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5150 and net lt 5250 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 593) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5250 and net lt 5350 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 602) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5350 and net lt 5450 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 612) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5450 and net lt 5550 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 622) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5550 and net lt 5650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 632) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5650 and net lt 5750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 641) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5750 and net lt 5850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 650) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5850 and net lt 5950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 660) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5950 and net lt 6050 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 670) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6050 and net lt 6150 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 680) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6150 and net lt 6250 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 689) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6250 and net lt 6350 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 699) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6350 and net lt 6450 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 709) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6450 and net lt 6550 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 718) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6550 and net lt 6650 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 728) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6650 and net lt 6750 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 737) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6750 and net lt 6850 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 747) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6850 and net lt 6950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 757) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6950 and ch1age le 11 and bsoch1 eq 767) bsoch1ok=1.

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* See if bsoch1ok should be turned on (ok = 1) for the first child, if their age is greater than or 11.

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if (net lt 650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 127) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 650 and net lt 750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 148) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 750 and net lt 850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 170) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 850 and net lt 950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 191) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 950 and net lt 1050 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 211) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1050 and net lt 1150 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 232) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1150 and net lt 1250 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 253) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1250 and net lt 1350 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 274) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1350 and net lt 1450 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 294) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1450 and net lt 1550 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 313) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1550 and net lt 1650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 333) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1650 and net lt 1750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 352) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1750 and net lt 1850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 371) bsoch1ok=1.

if (net ge 1850 and net lt 1950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 390) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 1950 and net lt 2050 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 409) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2050 and net lt 2150 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 429) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2150 and net lt 2250 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 448) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2250 and net lt 2350 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 467) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2350 and net lt 2450 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 486) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2450 and net lt 2550 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 505) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2550 and net lt 2650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 513) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2650 and net lt 2750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 520) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2750 and net lt 2850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 527) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2850 and net lt 2950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 533) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 2950 and net lt 3050 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 538) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3050 and net lt 3150 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 543) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3150 and net lt 3250 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 546) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3250 and net lt 3350 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 549) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3350 and net lt 3450 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 551) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3450 and net lt 3550 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 552) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3550 and net lt 3650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 553) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3650 and net lt 3750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 554) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3750 and net lt 3850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 558) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3850 and net lt 3950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 572) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 3950 and net lt 4050 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 584) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4050 and net lt 4150 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 598) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4150 and net lt 4250 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 611) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4250 and net lt 4350 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 625) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4350 and net lt 4450 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 637) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4450 and net lt 4550 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 649) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4550 and net lt 4650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 661) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4650 and net lt 4750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 673) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4750 and net lt 4850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 685) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4850 and net lt 4950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 697) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 4950 and net lt 5050 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 708) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5050 and net lt 5150 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 720) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5150 and net lt 5250 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 732) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5250 and net lt 5350 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 744) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5350 and net lt 5450 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 756) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5450 and net lt 5550 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 768) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5550 and net lt 5650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 779) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5650 and net lt 5750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 791) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5750 and net lt 5850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 803) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5850 and net lt 5950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 815) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 5950 and net lt 6050 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 827) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6050 and net lt 6150 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 839) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6150 and net lt 6250 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 851) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6250 and net lt 6350 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 863) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6350 and net lt 6450 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 875) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6450 and net lt 6550 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 887) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6550 and net lt 6650 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 899) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6650 and net lt 6750 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 911) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6750 and net lt 6850 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 923) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net ge 6850 and net lt 6950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 935) bsoch1ok=1.
if (net gt 6950 and ch1age gt 11 and bsoch1 eq 946) bsoch1ok=1.

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* See if bsoch2ok should be turned on (ok = 1) for the second child, if their age is less

* than or equal to 11.

*

if (net lt 650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 103) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 650 and net lt 750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 120) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 750 and net lt 850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 137) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 850 and net lt 950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 154) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 950 and net lt 1050 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 171) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1050 and net lt 1150 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 188) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1150 and net lt 1250 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 205) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1250 and net lt 1350 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 221) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1350 and net lt 1450 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 238) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1450 and net lt 1550 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 254) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1550 and net lt 1650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 269) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1650 and net lt 1750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 285) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1750 and net lt 1850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 300) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1850 and net lt 1950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 316) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1950 and net lt 2050 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 331) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2050 and net lt 2150 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 347) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2150 and net lt 2250 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 362) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2250 and net lt 2350 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 378) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2350 and net lt 2450 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 393) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2450 and net lt 2550 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 408) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2550 and net lt 2650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 416) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2650 and net lt 2750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 421) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2750 and net lt 2850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 427) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2850 and net lt 2950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 431) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2950 and net lt 3050 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 436) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3050 and net lt 3150 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 439) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3150 and net lt 3250 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 442) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3250 and net lt 3350 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 445) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3350 and net lt 3450 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 446) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3450 and net lt 3550 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 447) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3550 and net lt 3650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 448) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3650 and net lt 3750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 449) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3750 and net lt 3850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 452) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3850 and net lt 3950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 463) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3950 and net lt 4050 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 473) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4050 and net lt 4150 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 484) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4150 and net lt 4250 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 495) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4250 and net lt 4350 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 506) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4350 and net lt 4450 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 516) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4450 and net lt 4550 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 525) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4550 and net lt 4650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 535) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4650 and net lt 4750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 545) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4750 and net lt 4850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 554) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4850 and net lt 4950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 564) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4950 and net lt 5050 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 574) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5050 and net lt 5150 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 584) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5150 and net lt 5250 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 593) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5250 and net lt 5350 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 602) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5350 and net lt 5450 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 612) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5450 and net lt 5550 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 622) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5550 and net lt 5650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 632) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5650 and net lt 5750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 641) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5750 and net lt 5850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 650) bsoch2ok=1.

if (net ge 5850 and net lt 5950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 660) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5950 and net lt 6050 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 670) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6050 and net lt 6150 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 680) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6150 and net lt 6250 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 689) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6250 and net lt 6350 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 699) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6350 and net lt 6450 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 709) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6450 and net lt 6550 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 718) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6550 and net lt 6650 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 728) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6650 and net lt 6750 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 737) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6750 and net lt 6850 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 747) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6850 and net lt 6950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 757) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6950 and ch2age le 11 and bsoch2 eq 767) bsoch2ok=1

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* See if bsoch2ok should be turned on (ok = 1) for the second child, if their age is greater than 11.

*

if (net lt 650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 127) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 650 and net lt 750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 148) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 750 and net lt 850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 170) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 850 and net lt 950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 191) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 950 and net lt 1050 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 211) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1050 and net lt 1150 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 232) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1150 and net lt 1250 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 253) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1250 and net lt 1350 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 274) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1350 and net lt 1450 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 294) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1450 and net lt 1550 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 313) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1550 and net lt 1650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 333) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1650 and net lt 1750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 352) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1750 and net lt 1850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 371) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1850 and net lt 1950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 390) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 1950 and net lt 2050 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 409) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2050 and net lt 2150 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 429) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2150 and net lt 2250 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 448) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2250 and net lt 2350 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 467) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2350 and net lt 2450 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 486) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2450 and net lt 2550 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 505) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2550 and net lt 2650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 513) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2650 and net lt 2750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 520) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2750 and net lt 2850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 527) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2850 and net lt 2950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 533) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 2950 and net lt 3050 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 538) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3050 and net lt 3150 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 543) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3150 and net lt 3250 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 546) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3250 and net lt 3350 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 549) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3350 and net lt 3450 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 551) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3450 and net lt 3550 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 552) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3550 and net lt 3650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 553) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3650 and net lt 3750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 554) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3750 and net lt 3850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 558) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3850 and net lt 3950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 572) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 3950 and net lt 4050 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 584) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4050 and net lt 4150 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 598) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4150 and net lt 4250 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 611) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4250 and net lt 4350 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 625) bsoch2ok=1.

Stirling Is the Schedule Being Followed?

if (net ge 4350 and net lt 4450 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 637) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4450 and net lt 4550 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 649) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4550 and net lt 4650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 661) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4650 and net lt 4750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 673) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4750 and net lt 4850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 685) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4850 and net lt 4950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 697) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 4950 and net lt 5050 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 708) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5050 and net lt 5150 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 720) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5150 and net lt 5250 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 732) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5250 and net lt 5350 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 744) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5350 and net lt 5450 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 756) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5450 and net lt 5550 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 768) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5550 and net lt 5650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 779) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5650 and net lt 5750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 791) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5750 and net lt 5850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 803) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5850 and net lt 5950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 815) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 5950 and net lt 6050 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 827) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6050 and net lt 6150 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 839) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6150 and net lt 6250 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 851) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6250 and net lt 6350 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 863) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6350 and net lt 6450 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 875) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6450 and net lt 6550 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 887) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6550 and net lt 6650 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 899) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6650 and net lt 6750 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 911) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6750 and net lt 6850 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 923) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net ge 6850 and net lt 6950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 935) bsoch2ok=1.
if (net gt 6950 and ch2age gt 11 and bsoch2 eq 946) bsoch2ok=1

*

* If it's good for child 1 and 2, then it's good overall; set bsochok to 1.

* If their income is greater than 5000, it's a separate situation, make it 2.

*

if (bsoch1ok eq 1 and bsoch2ok eq 1) bsochok = 1.

if (net gt 5000) bsochok = 2.

*

* We know that if net income is less than 600 and bsoch's are 25, then it's ok.

*

if (net lt 600 and bsoch1 le 25 and bsoch2 le 25) bsochok = 1.

*

* And make 9's missing; that's what we wanted them to be.

*

missing values bsochok (9).

**Appendix B-1
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Two
Mothers with One Child**

			Step Two OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	14	28	42
		% within Step One OK	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
		% of Total	3.2%	6.3%	9.5%
	Yes	Count	7	394	401
		% within Step One OK	1.7%	98.3%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.6%	88.9%	90.5%
Total	Count	21	422	443	
	% within Step One OK	4.7%	95.3%	100.0%	
	% of Total	4.7%	95.3%	100.0%	

**Appendix B-2
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Two
Fathers with Two Children**

			Step Two OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	10	25	35
		% within Step One OK	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%
		% of Total	3.7%	9.2%	12.8%
	Yes	Count	5	233	238
		% within Step One OK	2.1%	97.9%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.8%	85.3%	87.2%
Total	Count	15	258	273	
	% within Step One OK	5.5%	94.5%	100.0%	
	% of Total	5.5%	94.5%	100.0%	

**Appendix B-3
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Two
Mothers with Two Children**

			Step Two OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	10	26	36
		% within Step One OK	27.8%	72.2%	100.0%
		% of Total	3.6%	9.5%	13.1%
	Yes	Count	6	232	238
		% within Step One OK	2.5%	97.5%	100.0%
		% of Total	2.2%	84.7%	86.9%
Total	Count	16	258	274	
	% within Step One OK	5.8%	94.2%	100.0%	
	% of Total	5.8%	94.2%	100.0%	

**Appendix B-4
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Two
Fathers with Three Children**

			Step Two OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	1	5	6
		% within Step One OK	16.7%	83.3%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.7%	8.6%	10.3%
	Yes	Count	1	51	52
		% within Step One OK	1.9%	98.1%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.7%	87.9%	89.7%
Total	Count	2	56	58	
	% within Step One OK	3.4%	96.6%	100.0%	
	% of Total	3.4%	96.6%	100.0%	

**Appendix B-5
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Two
Mothers with Three Children**

			Step Two OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count		6	6
		% within Step One OK		100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total		10.3%	10.3%
	Yes	Count	1	51	52
		% within Step One OK	1.9%	98.1%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.7%	87.9%	89.7%
Total	Count	1	57	58	
	% within Step One OK	1.7%	98.3%	100.0%	
	% of Total	1.7%	98.3%	100.0%	

**Appendix C-1
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Three
Fathers with One Child**

			Step Three OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	18	3	21
		% within Step One	85.7%	14.3%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.0%	.2%	1.1%
	Yes	Count	231	1629	1860
		% within Step One	12.4%	87.6%	100.0%
		% of Total	12.3%	86.6%	98.9%
Total	Count	249	1632	1881	
	% within Step One	13.2%	86.8%	100.0%	
	% of Total	13.2%	86.8%	100.0%	

**Appendix C-2
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Three
Mothers with One Child**

			Step Three OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	4	7	11
		% within Step One OK	36.4%	63.6%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.1%	1.9%	3.0%
	Yes	Count	27	327	354
		% within Step One OK	7.6%	92.4%	100.0%
		% of Total	7.4%	89.6%	97.0%
Total	Count	31	334	365	
	% within Step One OK	8.5%	91.5%	100.0%	
	% of Total	8.5%	91.5%	100.0%	

**Appendix C-3
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Three
Fathers with Two Children**

			Step Three OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	17	9	26
		% within Step One OK	65.4%	34.6%	100.0%
		% of Total	3.0%	1.6%	4.7%
	Yes	Count	100	432	532
		% within Step One OK	18.8%	81.2%	100.0%
		% of Total	17.9%	77.4%	95.3%
Total	Count	117	441	558	
	% within Step One OK	21.0%	79.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	21.0%	79.0%	100.0%	

**Appendix C-4
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Three
Mothers with Two Children**

			Step Three OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	1	4	5
		% within BSOCHOK	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	.7%	2.9%	3.7%
	Yes	Count	14	117	131
		% within BSOCHOK	10.7%	89.3%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.3%	86.0%	96.3%
Total	Count	15	121	136	
	% within BSOCHOK	11.0%	89.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	11.0%	89.0%	100.0%	

**Appendix C-5
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Three
Fathers with Three Children**

			Step Three OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count	4	1	5
		% within Step One OK	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	2.8%	.7%	3.4%
	Yes	Count	23	117	140
		% within Step One OK	16.4%	83.6%	100.0%
		% of Total	15.9%	80.7%	96.6%
Total	Count	27	118	145	
	% within Step One OK	18.6%	81.4%	100.0%	
	% of Total	18.6%	81.4%	100.0%	

**Appendix C-6
Likelihood of Following at Steps One and Three
Mothers with Three Children**

			Step Three OK		Total
			No	Yes	
Step One OK	No	Count		1	1
		% within Step One OK		100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total		2.1%	2.1%
	Yes	Count	4	42	46
		% within Step One OK	8.7%	91.3%	100.0%
		% of Total	8.5%	89.4%	97.9%
Total	Count	4	43	47	
	% within Step One OK	8.5%	91.5%	100.0%	
	% of Total	8.5%	91.5%	100.0%	

The Impact of Child Support: Balancing the Economic Needs of Children and their Noncustodial Parents

The purpose of this report is to analyze the economic impact of child support by comparing the differential effects on the noncustodial and custodial parents' households. Two related, primary questions are pursued:

1. What is the impact of child support on the *economic well-being* of the custodial and noncustodial households?
2. What is the impact of child support on the *poverty status* of the custodial and noncustodial households?

Methodology

In the first question, economic well-being is measured by the income-to-needs ratio, a standard employed by social scientists. For the analysis reported here, the numerator (income) is based on the gross monthly incomes of the mothers and fathers, as stated in the child support order. The denominator (needs) is the poverty threshold associated with a given family size, as defined by the U.S. Census.

Example: Assume the child support order is based on one child. If the family were intact, the family size would thus be three members: two adults and one child. Given that particular household composition, the annual needs, as determined by the poverty threshold, would be \$13,861.¹ The monthly income figures of both parents in the order are annualized and summed to establish intact family income. This is then divided by the needs measure to determine family well-being. Thus, we begin with a single measure of economic status based on one intact household.

Once the child support order is established, we consider two separate households: the custodial and noncustodial. For the one-child example above, assume the mother is the custodial parent. The economic well-being of the custodial mother's household is based on her gross income plus the amount of the child support order. To arrive at the custodial household's well-being, this figure is then divided by the poverty threshold for a family of two: one adult and one child. In 2000, the needs for such a family was \$11,869.

Similarly, the noncustodial father's well-being is based on his income minus the amount of the child support order, which is then divided by the poverty threshold for a one-adult household: in 2000, this was \$8,959.

Thus, the analysis will compare the well-being of the intact household to that of the custodial and noncustodial households.² An income-to-needs ratio equal to one means the household has just enough income to meet their minimum needs: the household's income is equal to the poverty threshold for their family composition. Those households who enjoy an income-to-needs greater

¹ This figure comes from the *U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty 2000*, www.Census.gov/hhes/poverty/theshld/thresh00.html.

² Of course, some of the households in the database were never *intact*. The measure, nonetheless, allows us to identify the standard of living the family would have enjoyed if it had been. Additionally, for each question, a separate analysis was also conducted for only those orders involving a divorce.

than one live about the poverty threshold, while those whose income-to-needs is less than one would be classified as “poor,” according to the official US poverty measure.

As the above discussion indicates, the income-to-needs ratio as a measure of the family’s standard of living is dependent upon income and household composition. To create the subsample for this analysis, we thus need to identify those orders for which we have the most reliable data on income and family size. With respect to the numerator, this entails that all orders which included any reference to potential additional income for either the custodial or noncustodial household were eliminated. Examples of such orders include those which indicate income from other adults, such as a new spouse or another adult living in the household; child support received for children not included in the order; and income earned or received by the children. Thus, all orders which indicated any income other than that of the mother and father identified in the order were eliminated.

Similarly, any orders with included reference to additional constraints on income, such as child support paid for other children, were omitted for the purpose of this analysis. Finally, with respect to household size, all orders which included any reference to potential other children or other adults living in either the custodial or noncustodial parent’s household were eliminated. A complete list of the variables used to create the subgroup analyzed throughout this report is listed on the next page.³

Findings

Tables One and Two show the economic well-being of the intact household, the custodial parent’s household, and the noncustodial parent’s household. Table One provides this analysis for the non-IVD cases, while Table Two presents it for the IVD cases. The top half of each table shows the results for the orders where the father is the noncustodial parent while the orders for noncustodial mothers are displayed in the bottom half.

Turning first to the non-IVD orders shown in Table One, the data clearly indicate that a much higher standard of living would be enjoyed by the family if it were intact than is available to either the custodial or noncustodial parent’s household. This is true whether the noncustodial parent is a mother or a father.

³ Readers familiarize with the database will note that variable W22, a “string” variable of notes on IV-D orders, is not listed in this table. While W22 does sometimes contain references to other children, more frequently it describes how income was derived. A cross-check was performed to ensure that those orders - where W22 included reference to other children -- were eliminated via one of the variables in the list above.

**List of Variables Used to Omit Orders
to Determine Income and Family Size**

All orders were eliminated which included any non-zero or non-missing values for the variables listed below. Note that a value for any of these variables would suggest either: 1) potential additional sources of income, thus increasing the household income; 2) potential additional uses of income, thus reducing household income; and/or 3) additional household members, thus changing the “needs” requirements.

1. Reason for Deviation
 - a. New Spouse Income
 - b. Income from Other Adults in the House
 - c. Child Support from other Relationships
 - d. Possession of Wealth
 - e. Extraordinary income of a child
 - f. Nonrecurring income
 - g. Extraordinary Debt
 - h. Court-ordered Reunification
 - i. Residential Schedule Credit
 - j. Blended Family Approach
 - k. Whole Family Approach (Arvey Split Custody)
2. Other Children Living in Either the Mother or Father’s Household.
3. Child Support Paid for Other Children, either by the Mother or the Father in the Order.
4. Names and ages of other children associated with the Mother or the Father in the Order.
5. “Other Factors.” These notes in the file often referred to other children in the custodial or noncustodial parent’s household.

**Table One: Income-to-Needs
Non-IVD Cases**

		Intact Household	Custodial Parent's Household	Noncustodial Parent's Household
Noncustodial Father	Median	4.6924	2.7007	4.1677
	Mean	5.7768	3.2245	5.4727
	N	450	450	450
	Minimum	1.17	.30	.90
	Maximum	49.87	53.53	91.08
	Std. Deviation	4.5097	2.9413	6.4662
Noncustodial Mother	Median	3.8958	3.3464	2.0359
	Mean	5.1722	3.9911	3.0791
	N	57	57	57
	Minimum	1.03	1.09	.14
	Maximum	30.30	13.96	36.61
	Std. Deviation	4.3690	2.5629	4.7987

For those orders where the father is the noncustodial parent, the median income-to-needs ratio for intact families is 4.69. Once we split those families for our analysis, the standard of living falls for both the households of custodial mothers and for noncustodial fathers.

However, the drop in the well-being of custodial mothers and their children is much more severe than that experienced by noncustodial fathers. Table One shows that the decline for custodial mothers and their children is from a median income-to-needs of 4.69 to 2.70, representing a decline of more than 42 percent. Noncustodial fathers do experience a drop in their standard of living as well, but it is only 11 percent, from a median value of 4.69 to 4.17.

The data in the bottom half of Table One further indicate that mothers are also much worse off when they are the noncustodial parent. This suggests, however, that children are economically better off when the mother is the noncustodial parent. Specifically, the data show that both custodial and noncustodial households experience a decline in their economic well-being compared to the intact scenario (as we also observed in the findings above for noncustodial fathers). However, the situation is reversed in terms of which household suffers the greatest decline in their well-being. When mothers are the noncustodial parents, their household experiences a 48 percent decline in their standard of living, as compared to the 11 percent decline for noncustodial fathers.

Custodial fathers and their children, on the other hand, see their well-being decline also, but by much less than that of custodial mothers: 14 percent compared to 42 percent.

Table Two provides the same analysis for IVD orders. As expected, we observe a much lower overall standard of living for the IVD orders: these households have a standard of living less than half of the non-IVD orders and in some cases, much less than that.

**Table Two: Income-to-Needs
IVD Cases**

		Intact Household	Custodial Parent's Household	Noncustodial Parent's Household
Noncustodial Father	Median	1.9474	1.0897	1.5993
	Mean	2.0243	1.0564	1.8840
	N	1731	1731	1731
	Minimum	.00	.00	-1.30
	Maximum	9.51	6.31	11.59
	Std. Deviation	1.3140	.8904	1.4099
Noncustodial Mother	Median	.9757	.1560	1.3180
	Mean	1.2391	.6929	1.1052
	N	470	470	470
	Minimum	.00	.00	-1.09
	Maximum	7.02	7.37	5.47
	Std. Deviation	1.3029	1.1640	.9589

Despite the dramatic difference in their overall standard of living, a similar pattern is observed in the orders for noncustodial fathers, which represent the vast majority of the cases. Like the non-IVD orders, the intact family enjoys a much higher standard of living, with a median income-to-needs ratio of 1.95, than that achieved by either the custodial or the noncustodial parent's household.

Again, similar to the non-IVD orders, the custodial mothers and their children fare much worse than the noncustodial fathers. These mothers and their children face a drop from a median standard of living of 1.95 to a level just above the poverty threshold, at 1.09. This means they experience a 44 percent drop in their standard of living, one very similar to that faced by the non-IVD custodial mothers and their children.

Also, similar to that of non-IVD orders is the experience of noncustodial fathers: while they face a decline in their standard of living from a median 1.95 to 1.60 (an 18 percent decline), it is much less than that observed above for custodial mothers and their children.

The singular reversal in the patterns observed above for both the non-IVD and IVD orders is observed in the final scenario: that seen in the bottom half of Table Two, displaying the outcomes associated with the IVD noncustodial mothers. This is the one situation where the intact family is not better off: well-being rises for noncustodial mothers. The median income-to-needs associated with these intact families is below the poverty threshold at .98, and noncustodial mothers see their standard of living rise by 34 percent, to a median of 1.32.

However, among all orders, the standard of living falls most precipitously for the custodial fathers and their children, from a median of .98 to a drastic low of .16, representing a disastrous 84 percent decline.

Child Support Orders Based on Divorce Orders

As suggested in the methodology section, the analysis of economic well-being is dependent upon a reliable measure of the income available to the family and the family's size. In this round of analysis, we attempt to refine our earlier measure even further. Here, in addition to the elimination of those cases discussed earlier, we further limit our analysis to only those orders brought about by a divorce. These orders are the most common type in the database and, moreover, they may be the least likely to have "other family" responsibilities and/or other sources of income.

Tables Three and Four present the findings for those child support orders associated with a divorce. They show very similar results to those discussed from Tables One and Two. Typically, the standard of living for split families is much lower than that of the intact household. And, identically to Tables One and Two, the only exception is observed in the case of noncustodial IVD mothers, who experience an increase in their standard of living in comparison to the intact family situation.

Additionally, the magnitudes are quite similar. The one significant difference between the results in Tables One and Two and those in Tables Three and Four is seen in custodial IVD fathers and their children: they do not face anywhere near as disastrous a decline in their well-being.

Table Three shows the divorce cases for the non-IVD orders. For those involving noncustodial fathers, custodial mothers and their children experience a decline in well-being of 42 percent, with a decrease in median income-to-needs from 4.66 to 2.70. This is identical to that seen in

Table One for all order types. Noncustodial, non-IVD divorced fathers also experience a decline in their standard of living, but it is much smaller: 12 percent.

The experience of non-IVD noncustodial mothers and custodial fathers reverses that of noncustodial fathers and custodial mothers, an identical result to that observed in Table One. That is, both noncustodial and custodial households experience a decline in economic well-being, but divorced custodial fathers and their children fare much better, with only an 11 percent decline in their standard of living, compared to that of divorced noncustodial mothers whose median income-to-needs falls by 50 percent.

**Table Three: Income-to-Needs
Non-IVD Cases
Divorces Only**

		Intact Household	Custodial Parent's Household	Noncustodial Parent's Household
Noncustodial Father	Median	4.6612	2.6978	4.0799
	Mean	5.5310	3.1836	5.0923
	N	357	357	357
	Minimum	1.17	.30	.90
	Maximum	45.97	53.53	62.95
	Std. Deviation	3.8294	3.1051	4.6003
Noncustodial Mother	Median	4.1234	3.6620	2.0391
	Mean	5.7045	4.2365	3.6757
	N	34	34	34
	Minimum	1.66	1.16	1.11
	Maximum	30.30	10.06	36.61
	Std. Deviation	5.0124	2.3099	6.0887

The results for divorced IVD orders are shown in Table Four. For those divorced, noncustodial fathers the experience is quite similar to that shown in Table Two for all order types. Their standard of living falls by 14 percent, which is again a much smaller drop than that of their children and their children's mothers. Divorced custodial mothers and their children see their well-being decline by 42 percent, sharing the identical fate of that of divorced non-IVD mothers (albeit at a much lower standard of living).

As noted above, the one exception to the decline in well-being is that of noncustodial, IVD divorced mothers. As we saw in Table Two, this is the one scenario where well-being increases relative to the intact family. The magnitudes for the divorced orders in Table Four are also similar to those observed for all order types in Table Two: noncustodial, IVD divorced mothers enjoy a gain in their income-to-needs ratio, from a median 1.40 to 1.48, an increase of 29 percent.⁴

⁴ The reader will note these are small cell sizes.

The one magnitudinal difference between the analysis of all orders and the divorce-only orders is that of the custodial IVD fathers and their children: their decline in well-being, while still large at 31 percent, is much smaller than the decline of 84 percent observed in Table Two.

**Table Four: Income-to-Needs
IVD Cases: Divorces Only**

		Intact Household	Custodial Parent's Household	Noncustodial Parent's Household
Noncustodial Father	Median	1.9808	1.1435	1.7091
	Mean	2.1208	1.1558	2.1359
	N	105	105	105
	Minimum	.00	.00	-.72
	Maximum	6.10	6.04	8.04
	Std. Deviation	1.1034	.8135	1.3767
Noncustodial Mother	Median	1.3991	.9592	1.4761
	Mean	1.6307	.9456	1.5190
	N	13	13	13
	Minimum	.66	.00	1.14
	Maximum	4.80	4.49	2.32
	Std. Deviation	1.0738	1.1983	.3078

The analysis of economic well-being, shown in Tables One through Four, suggests the critical importance of adequate child support orders. Each component of the analysis has underscored the differential impact of the child support order on the custodial parent and their children compared to the impact of child support on the noncustodial parent. In the vast majority of cases, the economic burden falls disproportionately on the custodial parent and the children. Custodial parents and their children typically experience a decline in their standard of living of more than 40 percent, compared to a much smaller drop for noncustodial parents. Given the prevalence of noncustodial mothers, the significant declines in the standard of living is most often felt by women and their children.⁵

The Impact of Child Support on Poverty Status

The final question to be pursued for this report is the impact of child support on the poverty status of noncustodial and custodial households. Given the virtual absence of poverty among the non-IVD orders, this analysis was only conducted for the IVD orders.

In order to determine the poverty rates associated with the orders in the database, a reliable subset must be extracted, identical to that needed for the construction of the income-to-needs measure. As we did in the previous section, all orders were omitted which included any reference to additional income or additional children to support. The same variables listed on page three were used to construct this subset.

⁵ This reflects, in part, the income gap between men and women.

To determine the poverty status of the households in the order, we use the official US poverty thresholds from the Census Bureau. This is the same measure we used in the construction of the “needs” portion of income-to-needs ratio.⁶ Those orders whose annualized gross income is less than the poverty threshold for their family composition are classified as “poor.”⁷

Identical to the analysis in the first section, for the intact family scenario, gross income consists of the two parents’ incomes summed; the noncustodial parent’s income is their income less the transfer amount; and the custodial parent’s income is their income plus the transfer payment.

Table Five shows the poverty rates for all order types, while Table Six displays the poverty status for the orders based on a divorce. As presented in Tables One - Four, the scenario where the father is the noncustodial parent is shown in the upper-half of each table, while the bottom-half of each table shows the results for those orders where the mother is the noncustodial parent.

These tables show the stark economic circumstances faced by custodial parents and their children. The poverty rates for these families far exceed the national poverty rate (approximately twelve percent) that prevailed at the time of the collection of these data. Moreover, the poverty status of custodial parents and their children is much greater than that of the noncustodial parent.

Table Five shows that for the orders associated with noncustodial fathers, the average poverty rate for intact households is 21 percent. Once the family resources are split among two separate households, the likelihood of being poor increases dramatically for a custodial mother and her children, rising to a mean of 49 percent. Thus, they are more than twice as likely to be poor as compared to the intact family situation. Moreover, they are more than three times as likely to be poor as the noncustodial fathers, whose average poverty rate is 15 percent.

The mean poverty rate of 15 percent for noncustodial fathers actually indicates an improvement in their economic circumstances, compared to the intact poverty rate of 21 percent.

Table Five: Poverty Rates for IVD Cases

		Whether Poor Intact	Whether Poor Custodial	Whether Poor Noncustodial
Noncustodial Father	Mean	.2057	.4841	.1537
	N	1731	1731	1731
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00
	Std. Deviation	.4043	.4999	.3607
Noncustodial Mother	Mean	.5511	.7596	.3170
	N	470	470	470
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00
	Std. Deviation	.4979	.4278	.4658

⁶ The Appendix at the end of this paper provides the programming for the construction of income-to-needs. As explained above, this will also provide the reader with the poverty thresholds used in this section of the analysis to determine poverty rates.

⁷ This is the same process conducted by the Census Bureau in determining poverty status.

**Table Six: Poverty Rates for IVD Cases
Divorces Only**

		Whether Poor Intact	Whether Poor Custodial	Whether Poor Noncustodial
Noncustodial Father	Mean	.1238	.4095	9.524E-02
	N	105	105	105
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	1.00	1.00	1.00
	Std. Deviation	.3309	.4941	.2950
Noncustodial Mother	Mean	.2308	.6154	.0000
	N	13	13	13
	Minimum	.00	.00	.00
	Maximum	1.00	1.00	.00
	Std. Deviation	.4385	.5064	.0000

The bottom half of Table Five reflects the very low earnings and income associated with those orders involving noncustodial IVD mothers. The intact poverty rate for this group is much higher than that of the intact poverty rate for noncustodial fathers: an average of 55 percent compared to the 21 percent observed in the top half of the table. Thus, even when the resources of the two parents are combined, the children of these families face dark economic circumstances.

Consequently, when these meager resources are split among two separate households, the situation becomes more dire: the poverty rate for the custodial fathers and their children is over 75 percent. The poverty rate remains high, but shows an improvement relative to the intact household data, for noncustodial mothers: decreasing from an average of 55 percent to 32 percent.

Table Six shows this analysis for the orders based on a divorce. Given the higher incomes associated with the divorce orders, the poverty rates observed in this table are lower overall compared to Table Five. However, similar trends are observed. The poverty rate for custodial parents and their children rises dramatically, compared to the intact household.

For custodial mothers and their children, the average poverty rate is 41 percent compared to the intact poverty rate of 12 percent. This represents a more than tripling of the likelihood of being poor for these mothers and their children. They are – as we have observed throughout this report – much more likely to be poor than noncustodial fathers, whose average poverty rate is just over 9 percent. Again, as in Table Five, we observe that noncustodial fathers experience an improvement in their economic circumstances while custodial mothers and their children become much worse off.

The bottom half of Table Six shows the poverty rates for those orders based on noncustodial, divorced mothers. Although the sample sizes are small at this juncture, the results are markedly similar to those we have observed repeatedly in this report: custodial parents and their children experience a sharp decline in their economic circumstances relative to the intact household, while noncustodial parents fare much better. The average poverty rate among noncustodial mothers

falls to zero, compared to 23 percent for the intact scenario. This is contrasted to the bleak economic circumstances of custodial fathers and their children who face a poverty rate of 62 percent.

Summary

In conclusion, the data portray a coherent but distressing portrayal of the economic status of custodial parents and their children. Regardless of the measure used to define economic status (the income-to-needs ratio or the poverty rate) and regardless of which subset is analyzed (non-IVD or IVD, all child support orders or only those arising from a divorce), the evidence points in the same direction. Most households are much better off when the family is intact and the economic resources are shared. Splitting the resources among two households makes both the noncustodial and the custodial households worse off. However, the impact of splitting those resources falls disproportionately on the custodial parents and their children, who face a severe and often crippling decline in their standard of living.

Appendix: Programming for Income-to-Needs

*

* First, let's estimate what total gross would be if they were still living together - use as
* estimate of income before separation. Calculate annual income, then divide by needs
* appropriate to number of kids.

*

compute totgross = fgross + mgross.

if (numkids eq 1) y2needb4 = 12*totgross / 13861 .

if (numkids eq 2) y2needb4 = 12*totgross / 17463 .

if (numkids eq 3) y2needb4 = 12*totgross / 20550 .

if (numkids eq 4) y2needb4 = 12*totgross / 23009 .

if (numkids eq 5) y2needb4 = 12*totgross / 25772 .

*

* If the noncustodial parent is the man (ncp=1), compute monthly income for custodial
* parent as mother's gross plus father's transfer. Then proceed as above.

*

if (numkids eq 1 and ncp eq 1) y2needcp = 12*(mgross+ftrxpymn) / 11869 .

if (numkids eq 2 and ncp eq 1) y2needcp = 12*(mgross+ftrxpymn) / 13874 .

if (numkids eq 3 and ncp eq 1) y2needcp = 12*(mgross+ftrxpymn) / 17524 .

if (numkids eq 4 and ncp eq 1) y2needcp = 12*(mgross+ftrxpymn) / 20236 .

if (numkids eq 5 and ncp eq 1) y2needcp = 12*(mgross+ftrxpymn) / 22579 .

* If the noncustodial parent is the woman (ncp=2), compute monthly income
* for custodial parent as father's gross plus mother's transfer. Then proceed as above.

*

if (numkids eq 1 and ncp eq 2) y2needcp = 12*(fgross+mtrxpymn) / 11869 .

if (numkids eq 2 and ncp eq 2) y2needcp = 12*(fgross+mtrxpymn) / 13874 .

if (numkids eq 3 and ncp eq 2) y2needcp = 12*(fgross+mtrxpymn) / 17524 .

if (numkids eq 4 and ncp eq 2) y2needcp = 12*(fgross+mtrxpymn) / 20236 .

if (numkids eq 5 and ncp eq 2) y2needcp = 12*(fgross+mtrxpymn) / 22579 .

*

* The noncustodial parent is easy - their gross minus transfer divided by
* needs for one person.

*

if (ncp eq 1) y2neednc = 12*(fgross-ftrxpymn) / 8959 .

if (ncp eq 2) y2neednc = 12*(mgross-mtrxpymn) / 8959 .